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NOTE
THE UNCONSCIONABILITY OF
CONSCIENCE CLAUSES:
PHARMACISTS' CONSCIENCES AND
WOMEN'S ACCESS TO
CONTRACEPTION
Jed Millert
To say that contraceptives are immoral as such, and are to be
forbidden to... persons who will nevertheless persist in hav-
ing intercourse, means that such persons must risk for them-
selves an unwanted pregnancy, for the child, illegitimacy, and
for society, a possible obligation of support. Such a view of
morality is not only the very mirror image of sensible legisla-
tion.., it conflicts with fundamental human rights.'
"[C]onstitutional rights 'cannot be allowed to yield simply be-
cause of disagreement with them. "-2
INTRODUCTION
Pharmacists are now at the forefront of the controversy surround-
ing abortion and contraception. In recent years, some pharmacists,
I J.D. Candidate, Case Western Reserve University School of Law, 2006;
B.A., Oklahoma State University, 2003. I would like to thank Professor Jessica Berg,
Andy Dorchak, Andrea Telloni, Professor Jessie Hill, Professor Jonathan Entin, John
Rotterman, and my parents, Drs. David and Sylvia Miller.
1 Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438, 452-53 (1972) (quoting Baird v. Eisen-
stadt, 429 F.2d 1398, 1402 (1st Cir. 1970), affid, 405 U.S. 438 (1972)) (discussing the
right to use contraception).
2 Valley Hosp. Ass'n, Inc. v. Mat-Su Coal. for Choice, 948 P.2d 963, 972
(Alaska 1997) (quoting Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 349 U.S. 294, 300 (1955)) (discussing
reproductive rights as they relate to the state's interest).
3 Stephanie Simon, Pharmacists New Players in Abortion Debate; Six States
Consider Legislation That Would Shield Those Who Refuse to Dispense the "Morn-
ing-After" Pill as a Matter of Conscience, L.A. TIMEs, Mar. 20, 2004, at A18
HEAL TH M TRIX
motivated by religious or moral scruples, have refused to dispense
birth control and emergency contraception (EC) to their female cus-
tomers. As a result, women's efforts to obtain contraception have
been frustrated. The earliest report of a pharmacist who refused to
dispense EC was in 1991.5 Since then, pharmacists across the country
have acted on their beliefs and denied women access to contraception.
In 1996, for instance, an Ohio pharmacist refused to dispense EC to a
female patron.6 In January 2004, a Texas pharmacist objected to fill-
ing a rape victim's prescription for EC.7 He explained, "I don't think
it's fair that I be forced to participate in a chain of events that results
in the taking of a life."8 Later that year, another Texas pharmacist
refused to dispense birth control pills for a mother of two.9 When
asked to explain his refusal, he told the woman birth control pills
"cause cancer."' 0 After refusing to fill a prescription for birth control
pills, a K-Mart pharmacist in Wisconsin declined to transfer the cus-
("[p]harmacists are now on the front line of the abortion issue"). Pharmacists also
confront other controversial issues, such as assisted suicide and euthanasia. See Bryan
A. Dykes, Note, Proposed Rights of Conscience Legislation: Expanding to Include
Pharmacists and Other Health Care Providers, 36 GA. L. REv. 565, 586 (2002); Lynn
D. Wardle, Protecting the Rights of Conscience of Health Care Providers, and 14 J.
LEGAL MED. 177, 181 (1993) (stating that as medical technologies expand and social
attitudes change, the number of medical services involving potential conflicts of
conscience is likely to increase).
4 However, pharmacists are not the only health care providers who have
refused to dispense contraception. See, e.g., Must Hospitals Give the Morning-After
Pill?, TRIAL, June 1989, at 92, 93 (stating that many religious hospitals refuse to
distribute EC); Meghan Gordon, Nurse Sues Parish Hospital; She Refused to Give
'Morning After Pill,' TIMES-PICAYUNE, June 29, 2005, at Al (describing a nurse who
refused to dispense EC). Although some pharmacists have recently objected to dis-
pensing contraceptives, many pharmacists have willingly distributed condoms and
prescription contraceptives for quite some time. See Bernard M. Dickens, Reproduc-
tive Health Services and the Law and Ethics of Conscientious Objection, 20 MED. &
L. 283, 290 (2001).
5 Julie Cantor & Ken Baum, The Limits of Conscientious Objection - May
Pharmacists Refuse to Fill Prescriptions for Emergency Contraception?, 351 NEW
ENG. J. MED. 2008, 2008 (2004).
6 James F. Sweeney, May a Pharmacist Refuse to Fill a Prescription?,
PLAIN DEALER, May 5, 2004, at E1.
7 Contraception: Pharmacist's Refusal to Fill Emergency Contraception
Script Raises Questions, AGING & ELDER HEALTH WK, Mar. 21, 2004, at 33 [hereinaf-
ter Contraception]; Marilyn Gardner, Pharmacists' Moral Beliefs vs. Women's Legal
Rights, CHRISTIAN SCI. MONITOR, Apr. 26, 2004, at 11; Sweeney, supra note 6, at El.
8 Contraception, supra note 7, at 33.
9 Gardner, supra note 7, at 11; Sweeney, supra note 6, at El.
10 Gretel C. Kovach, Pharmacist Refuses to Refill Birth Control North Texas
Woman Denied Pill Because of Moral Conflict, DALLAS MORNING NEWS, Mar. 31,
2004, at IA.
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tomer and her prescription to a different pharmacy."1 Similar refusals
have also occurred in Missouri, 12 California, Georgia, Louisiana,
Massachusetts, North Carolina, and Washington. 13 More recently, in
autumn 2004, a New Hampshire pharmacist refused to dispense EC to
a twenty-one-year-old single mother. 14 After refusing to refer her to
another pharmacist, he berated her.'
5
As these stories illustrate, some pharmacists refuse to dispense
contraception, 16 while others refuse even to refer objectionable pre-
scriptions to willing pharmacists. 17 Studies of pharmacists' attitudes
reflect these sentiments. In a 1972 survey of 780 Pennsylvania phar-
macists, 25 percent believed unmarried minors should not be allowed
to purchase contraceptives, while 10 percent believed married minors
should also be barred from such purchases. 18 According to the study,
11 Gardner, supra note 7, at 11; Sweeney, supra note 6, at El. According to
the pharmacist's attorney, the pharmacist "sincerely believes he would be committing
an act of sin to dispense [birth control], and to call someone else to dispense it."
Gardner, supra note 7, at 11.
12 See Simon, supra note 3. Interestingly, the Missouri legislature considered
a conscience clause that would have protected pharmacists who refused to transfer
prescriptions. Cantor & Baum, supra note 5, at 2008.
13 Marcia D. Greenberger & Rachel Laser, Bill Would Let Beliefs Hinder
Health Care, TUCSON CITIZEN, Feb. 2, 2005, at 5B.
14 Cantor & Baum, supra note 5, at 2008.
15 Id.
16 Pharmacists Refusing to Fill Contraceptive Prescriptions Due to Religious
Beliefs (NBC Evening News television broadcast Aug. 31, 2004) [hereinafter Phar-
macists]. While the instances cited in the introductory paragraph all involve EC or
birth control pills, some pharmacists also find barrier methods of contraception objec-
tionable. See Rende C. Wyser-Pratte, Comment, Protection of RU-486 as Contracep-
tion, Emergency Contraception and as an Abortifacient Under the Law of Contracep-
tion, 79 OR. L. REv. 1121, 1132 (2000).
17 Robert M. Veatch, Analysis and Commentary, in Pharmacist's Refusal to
Dispense Diethylstilbestrolfor Contraceptive Use, 46 PHARMACY ETHICS 1415, 1415
(1989). Other health care providers also find contraception and abortifacients objec-
tionable. See Neville H. Golden et al., Emergency Contraception: Pediatricians'
Knowledge, Attitudes, and Opinions, 107 PEDIATRICS 287, 289 (2001) (stating that 12
percent of pediatricians surveyed would not prescribe EC for moral or religious rea-
sons). Furthermore, pharmacists in the United States have a much less favorable
attitude toward EC than their counterparts in other countries. See N. Hariparsad, Atti-
tudes and Practices of Pharmacists Towards Emergency Contraception in Durban,
South Africa, 6 EUR. J. CONTRACEPTION & REPROD. HEALTH CARE 87, 89 (2001) (de-
scribing a survey of 112 South African pharmacists, in which "[s]ixty-nine percent
... felt that emergency contraceptive pills should be available without a prescription
and 67 [percent] felt that increasing public awareness regarding emergency contracep-
tion was very important").
18 Ronald A. Chez, The Role of the Pharmacist in Family Planning: A Penn-
sylvania Survey, 12 J. AM. PHARMACEUTICAL ASS'N 464, 465 (1972). Some pharma-
cists have avoided the controversy altogether by refusing to stock EC. Molly
239
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religion played a significant role in the decisions of those pharmacists
who believed unmarried minors should not have access to contracep-
tion. 19 In a 1994-95 survey, also conducted in Pennsylvania, 29 per-
cent of pharmacists stated they would refuse to distribute an abortifa-
cient on religious or moral grounds.20 According to a national survey,
36 percent of pharmacists stated they would refuse to dispense an
abortifacient. 21 However, this number is higher in some areas, such as
the South, where 44 percent of pharmacists stated they would refuse.22
Because some pharmacists consider EC to be an abortifacient, these
numbers may also reflect pharmacists' attitudes regarding some forms
of contraception.23 A 2000 study of pharmacists in New Jersey and
Oregon found that while 26 percent of New Jersey pharmacists and 19
percent of Oregon pharmacists had (mostly personal) reservations
about dispensing EC, a relatively small percentage of those pharma-
cists--4 percent in New Jersey and 10 percent in Oregon-would
actually act on those reservations and refuse to dispense EC.24
Courts must recognize that a woman's constitutional right to
obtain contraception should not be hindered by a pharmacist's
conscience. 25  Given some pharmacists' antipathy toward
contraception, holding otherwise would make the right to
contraception an "empty right., 26 The thesis of this Note is that
conscience clauses that provide legal protection to pharmacists who
McDonough, Rx for Controversy: Battle over Dispensing Emergency Contraceptives
Creates Competing Legislation, ABA J. REPORT (June 10, 2005),
http://www.abanet.org/journal/ereport/jnl0pill.html. According to a study conducted
in May 2005, less than 29 percent of pharmacies in Missouri stock EC. Id.
19 Chez, supra note 18, at 465.
20 Vincent Giannetti, Pharmacists'Beliefs About Abortion and RU-486, 36 J.
AM. PHARMACEUTICAL ASS'N 698, 700-01 (1996). Attitudes toward barrier methods
of contraception, on the other hand, are much more favorable. See Karyn Snyder,
Ethical Hot Spots, 141 DRUG Topics 41, 59 (1997) (describing a 1997 study which
found that most pharmacists believed it was acceptable to provide a twelve-year-old
boy with condoms).
21 Giannetti, supra note 20, at 703 (citing another survey).
22 Id. (citing another survey).
23 See infra notes 75-82 and accompanying text.
24 Peter D. Hart Research Assoc., A Survey Among the General Public and
Licensed Pharmacists in New Jersey and Oregon Conducted on Behalf of RHTP
(2000), http://ec.princeton.edu/news/survey.html (last visited Sept. 7, 2005).
25 Contra Wardle, supra note 3, at 219-21 (citing abuses health care workers
face resulting from their beliefs and describing the need for strong rights of con-
science legislation).
26 See Rebecca S. Dresser, Freedom of Conscience, Professional Responsi-
bility, and Access to Abortion, 22 J.L. MED. & ETHics 280, 280 (1994) (discussing the
implications of restricting abortion and its interplay with professional medical respon-
sibility).
[Vol. 16:237
2006] THE UNCONSCIONABILITY OF CONSCIENCE CLA USES 241
refuse to dispense contraception or refer patients to willing
pharmacists" violate the right to access contraception espoused by the
United States Supreme Court in Griswold v. Connecticut2 8 and Carey
v. Population Services International.29 Part I of this Note provides a
brief background and description of conscience clauses. Part II, which
is divided into three subparts, analyzes the constitutionality of
pharmacist conscience clauses. First, it explores the ethical, medical,
and legal distinctions between contraception and abortion. It argues
that birth control and EC should be treated as contraception and
protected under the Supreme Court's contraception jurisprudence.
Second, it describes the cases that establish the right to contraception.
Third, it analyzes whether pharmacist conscience clauses violate this
right. Part III proposes how conscience clauses should be changed in
order to protect pharmacists' consciences without jeopardizing
women's access to contraception. Part IV urges that in the absence of
legal protections, policy considerations dictate that pharmacists should
dispense objectionable drugs to their customers or refer their
customers to willing pharmacists, even if doing so violates their
conscience.
I. BACKGROUND
A. What are Conscience Clauses?
Conscience clauses, also known as rights of conscience legisla-
tion30 or refusal clauses, 31 protect health care providers who refuse to
provide certain services, such as abortion, which those providers find
objectionable on religious or ethical grounds.32 Pharmacist conscience
clauses protect pharmacists from legal liability and disciplinary, dis-
criminatory, or recriminatory actions that could result from conscien-
27 For purposes of brevity, this Note will refer to such conscience clauses as
"pharmacist conscience clauses."
28 381 U.S. 479 (1965).
29 431 U.S. 678 (1977) (holding that the suppression of contraceptive adver-
tisements is not justified).
30 See Dykes, supra note 3, at 567 (discussing the balance of health care and
patient autonomy through legislation).
31 See Pharmacists, supra note 16.
32 See Wardle, supra note 3, at 177, 178 (stating the purpose of conscience
clauses is to protect health care providers who object to participating in certain ser-
vices). One-third of jurisdictions do not require conscientious objection to be based
on moral or religious grounds. Id. at 196. Some fear that conscience clauses could
lead to a slippery slope whereby health care providers could refuse medication on any
grounds (no matter how arbitrary). See Contraception, supra note 7, at 33.
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tious objection.33 Pharmacists face a number of unpleasant conse-
quences that, in the absence of a conscience clause, could result from
their failure to dispense medication.34 First, refusal could have ramifi-
cations on their employment, the most likely of which are termination
or demotion. 35 Second, since pharmacists owe a duty of reasonable
care to their customers, they could face potential tort liability for fail-
ing to dispense medication or refer a patient to another pharmacist.
36
Additionally, pharmacists who refuse to distribute contraception or
abortifacients could be liable for wrongful birth, wrongful pregnancy,
or wrongful conception claims.37 Finally, a woman who is forced to
search for a willing pharmacist after learning that her pharmacist will
not provide her with EC may be able to recover damages for the emo-
tional pain and suffering resulting from her hurried and frantic attempt
to find a willing pharmacist to dispense EC in the small time frame
available.38
B. Legal Background
Several states enacted conscience clauses in the 1970s in response
to Roe v. Wade.3 9 Today, forty-four states have conscience clauses
33 See Dykes, supra note 3, at 574. However, uncertainty surrounding con-
science clauses and their potentially limited application to pharmacists means that
pharmacists may not always be protected by conscience clauses. See Donald W.
Herbe, The Right to Refuse: A Call for Adequate Protection of a Pharmacist's Right
to Refuse Facilitation of Abortion and Emergency Contraception, 17 J. L. & HEALTH
77, 100 (2002-03). Hostile interpretations of conscience clauses could also limit the
protection afforded to pharmacists. Cf. Wardle, supra note 3, at 199-206 (describing
"hostile interpretations" that limited the effect of conscience clauses in other con-
texts).
34 But see David B. Brushwood & Buford T. Lively, Refusal to Dispense a
Prescription: What is the Law?, AM. PHARMACY, Oct. 1989, at 29 (describing how in
certain situations pharmacists are under a legal duty to refuse to dispense drugs).
35 Herbe, supra note 33, at 89.
36 Id. at 90.
31 Id. at 91.
38 Id. at 92.
39 Dykes, supra note 3, at 586; Melissa Querido, Q. What are Conscience
Clauses, and How Do They Affect a Woman's Right to Choose?, REPROD. FREEDOM
NEWS, Oct. 1998, at 2. Twenty-eight states have conscience clauses that only protect
the right to refuse to participate in an abortion. Wardle, supra note 3, at 179. For a
more comprehensive history of "protection of conscience in America," see Protecting
the Rights of Conscience of Health Care Providers and a Parent's Right to Know:
Hearing Before the H. Comm. on Energy and Commerce, 107th Cong. 29-31 (state-
ment of Lynn Wardle, Professor of Law, J. Reuben Clark Law School, Brigham
Young University), http://frwebgate.access.gpo.gov/cgi-bin/getdoc.cgi?dbname= 107_
househearings&docid=f:80684.pdf [hereinafter Protecting] (last visited Oct. 25,
2005).
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regarding abortion.40 Because conscience clauses were enacted in
response to abortion in the 1970s, when most abortions were surgical,
few states have conscience clauses that explicitly apply to
pharmacists.4' Pharmacist conscience clauses, which enjoy relatively
high support among pharmacists,42 are largely opposed by the general
public.43 Nonetheless, several states are currently considering such
legislation. 44 Currently, four states have conscience clauses explicitly
40 Herbe, supra note 33, at 97; NARAL Pro-Choice America Found., State
Refusal Clauses for Abortion, http://www.naral.org/facts/loader.cfm?url=/common
spot/security/getfile.cfn&PagelD=-7839 (last visited Oct. 25, 2005). For a description
of state conscience clauses, see Protecting, supra note 39, at 31-34.
4 1 Alan Meisel, Pharmacists, Physician-Assisted Suicide, and Pain Control,
2 J. HEALTH CARE L. & POL'Y 211, 234 (1999). Some commentators believe expand-
ing conscience clause protection to pharmacists will ultimately be ineffective. See
Dykes, supra note 3, at 591 ("As state legislatures respond to the FDA approval of
R.U. 486, they should recognize and protect the rights of conscience of more health
care providers, including pharmacists, and in relation to health care procedures be-
sides abortion .... A quick statutory fix for pharmacists would be a minimal and
inefficient response.").
42 See Testimony: Hearing on H.B. 2711 Before the S. Pub. Health and Wel-
fare Comm., 2002 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Kan. 2002) (statement of Paula Koch, licensed
pharmacist), available at http://www.pfli.org/PkochTestimonyKSSenate2002.
html [hereinafter Testimony] (last visited Oct. 25, 2005) (stating that in a 2001 survey
of Kansas pharmacists, 86 percent supported a pharmacist conscience clause); Peter
D. Hart Research Assoc., supra note 24 (stating that 59 percent of New Jersey phar-
macists and 68 percent of Oregon pharmacists support conscience clauses).
43 See Protecting, supra note 39, at 19 (statement of Catherine Weiss, Direc-
tor, American Civil Liberties Union, Reproductive Freedom Project) ("88 [percent]
[of the general public] oppose 'allowing pharmacies to refuse to fill prescriptions they
object to on religious grounds."'); Peter D. Hart Research Assoc., supra note 24 (stat-
ing that 79 percent of New Jersey voters and 69 percent of Oregon voters oppose
conscience clauses). Cf Religion at the Drugstore, CBS NEWS, Nov. 23, 2004, http://
www.cbsnews.com/stories/2004/11/23/opinion/polls/printable657413.shtml [hereinaf-
ter Religion] (last visited Oct. 25, 2005) (stating that 78 percent of Americans believe
pharmacists should not be able to refuse to dispense birth control on religious
grounds).
44 See Carlos Campos, Legislature '05: Abortion Foes Target Use of Pill;
Druggists May Refuse to Dispense, ATLANTA J. CONST., Feb. 4, 2005, at 1E (describ-
ing the Georgia legislature's efforts to make pharmacists immune from lawsuits for
refusing to dispense emergency contraceptives); Gardner, supra note 7, at 11 (stating
that ten states are considering conscience clause legislation for pharmacists); Green-
berger & Laser, supra note 13, at 5B (Arizona); Sherry Jacobson & Gretel C.
Kovach, Pharmacists' Right to Refuse Challenged Druggist Group Defends Denying
Contraceptives on Moral Grounds, DALLAS MORNING NEWS, Apr. 1, 2004, at 1A
(stating that at least five states are considering conscience clauses to protect pharma-
cists); Marina Pisano, Conservative Judicial Forces Threaten Cause of Abortion
Advocates; Bush's Re-Election, Republican Senate Majority May Bring More Legal
Battles to Shake the Foundation of Roe vs. Wade, SAN ANTONIO EXPRESS-NEws, Jan.
23, 2005, at 1K (Texas); Simon, supra note 3 (stating that at least six states are con-
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protecting pharmacists: Arkansas, South Dakota, Mississippi, and
Georgia.45
However, the broad conscience clauses present in many states
may also implicitly protect pharmacists.46 For instance, although
Ohio's conscience clause does not expressly mention pharmacists, it
has been interpreted to include them.47 Similarly, the broad language
employed by Illinois's conscience clause also applies to pharmacists.4
While most conscience clauses only protect health care providers who
refuse to participate in an abortion, a few states also protect health
care providers who refuse to provide contraception. 49 It is not clear if
EC is covered by abortion-oriented conscience clauses, since, as one
author noted, "[M]ost statutes define 'abortion' as the 'termination of
a human pregnancy' without defining 'pregnancy. ' ' 50 South Dakota,
Arkansas, Georgia, and Mississippi all have pharmacist-specific con-
science clauses. The South Dakota conscience clause states,
No pharmacist may be required to dispense medication if
there is reason to believe that the medication would be used
to: (1) Cause an abortion; or (2) Destroy an unborn child....
No such refusal to dispense medication pursuant to this sec-
tion may be the basis for any claim for damages against the
pharmacist or the pharmacy of the pharmacist or the basis for
sidering such legislation); Sweeney, supra note 6 (Ohio); State Policies in Brief:
Refusing to Provide Health Services (Alan Guttmacher Inst., New York, N.Y.), Aug.
1, 2005, http://www.guttmacher.org/statecenter/spibs/spibRPHS.pdf [hereinafter
Guttmacher].
45 Guttmacher, supra note 44.
46 See Wardle, supra note 3, at 182 (noting that "[o]ne-half of state con-
science clauses broadly protect any 'person'). Cf McDonough, supra note 18
("Twenty states already have 'conscience' laws that give pharmacists the right to
refuse to fill prescriptions based on their moral or religious beliefs.").
For an argument that the phrase "health care providers" should be inter-
preted so as to include pharmacists, see William L. Allen & David B. Brushwood,
Pharmaceutically Assisted Death and the Pharmacist's Right of Conscience, 5 J.
PHARMACY & L. 1, 14 (1996).
47 Brauer v. K-Mart Corp., No. C-1-99-618, slip op. at 12 (S.D. Ohio Jan. 23,
2001) ("[T]he plain language of the [Ohio] statute requires that the protections of the
statute be afforded to all individuals who play a role in medical procedures which
result in abortion, be they doctors, nurses, technicians, pharmacists, or others.") (em-
phasis added).
48 Herbe, supra note 33, at 97.
49 Id. at 98-99.
50 Id.
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any disciplinary, recriminatory, or discriminatory action
against the pharmacist.
5
'
South Dakota defines an "unborn person" as "an individual organism
of the species homo sapiens from fertilization until live birth. 52 Ar-
kansas's statute specifically enables pharmacists to refuse to dispense
contraceptives.53 Georgia's conscience clause explicitly protects
pharmacists who refuse to fill prescriptions for any "emergency con-
traceptive drug" so long as they state in writing their objection[s] to
abortion[s] and their objection[s] is based on "moral or religious
grounds. ' 4 The Mississippi conscience clause allows pharmacists to
refuse to dispense any drug to which they have any moral, religious,
or ethical objection. 55 It also allows pharmacists to refuse to refer pa-
tients to a willing pharmacist. 56 The Georgia, Arkansas, and South
Dakota statutes, in contrast, do not state whether pharmacists may
refuse to refer patients.
51 S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 36-11-70 (Michie 2003) (emphasis added).
52 S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 22-1-2 (Michie 2003) (emphasis added).
53 See ARK. CODE ANN. § 20-16-304 (2000).
(4) Nothing ... shall prohibit a physician, pharmacist, or any other author-
ized paramedical personnel from refusing to furnish any contraceptive pro-
cedures, supplies, or information; and (5) No private institution or physi-
cian, nor any agent or employee of such institution or physician, nor any
employee of a public institution acting under directions of a physician, shall
be prohibited from refusing to provide contraceptive procedures, supplies,
and information when the refusal is based upon religious or conscientious
objection. No such institution, employee, agent, or physician shall be held
liable for the refusal.
ARK. CODE ANN. § 20-16-304. Arkansas's conscience clause also has a broad provi-
sion covering abortion. See ARK. CODE ANN. § 20-16-601 (2000).
(a) No person shall be required to perform or participate in medical proce-
dures which result in the termination of pregnancy. The refusal of any per-
son to perform or participate in these medical procedures shall not be a ba-
sis for civil liability to any person nor a basis for any disciplinary or any
other recriminatory action against him.
ARK. CODE ANN. § 20-16-304.
14 S.B. 123, 2005 Leg. Reg. Sess. (Ga. 2005) (enacted). The Georgia Admin-
istrative Code goes even further. It insulates pharmacists who refuse to fill any pre-
scription on moral or religious grounds from disciplinary liability. Compare GA.
ADMIN. CODE § 480-5-.03(2005) ("The Board is authorized to take disciplinary action
for unprofessional conduct.") with GA. ADMIN. CODE § 480-5-.03(n) (2005) ("It shall
not be considered unprofessional conduct for any pharmacist to refuse to fill any
prescription based on his/her professional judgment or ethical or moral beliefs.").
5' See S.B. 2619, 2004 Leg. Reg. Sess. (Miss. 2004) (enacted); Miss. CODE
ANN. § 41-107-3(a)&(b) (2005); MISS. CODE ANN. § 41-107-5(l)-(3) (2005).
56 See S.B. 2619, 2004 Leg. Reg. Sess. (Miss. 2004) (enacted); MIss. CODE
ANN. § 41-107-3(a)&(b) (2005); MISS. CODE ANN. § 41-107-5(l)-(3) (2005).
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II. CONSTITUTIONAL ANALYSIS
A. Contraception or Abortion?
The distinction between contraception and abortion lies at the
heart of the conscience clause controversy. This distinction is
important for two reasons. First, many pharmacists who refuse to
dispense EC view it as equivalent to abortion and thus find it morally
objectionable. Second, whether EC is classified as a contraceptive or
an abortifacient dramatically affects which constitutional standard is
applicable to pharmacist conscience clauses. This section briefly
describes different forms of contraception and explains pharmacists'
beliefs regarding contraception. It argues that EC and birth control are
legally and medically distinguishable from abortion and should
therefore be protected under the Supreme Court's contraception
jurisprudence.
There are several different types of contraception, including "bar-
rier-method" contraceptives, 57 standard birth control pills, EC,58 and
mifepristone (RU-486). 59 Barrier methods, such as condoms and dia-
phragms, simply prevent sperm from reaching the egg.60 Birth control
pills, by contrast, avert pregnancy by preventing ovulation.6' EC,
which has been available for over twenty years,62 must be taken
within seventy-two hours of intercourse 63 and is roughly 75 percent
effective in preventing pregnancy. 64 It functions by preventing ovula-
tion or if fertilization has already occurred, by preventing implantation
of the fertilized egg.65 It is ineffective after implantation, which takes
57 Gwendolyn Prothro, RU 486 Examined: Impact of a New Technology on
an Old Controversy, 30 U. MICH. J. L. REFORM 715, 718 (1997).
58 ECs are also known as "morning-after pills," oral contraceptives, hormo-
nal contraceptives, and postcoital contraceptives. See Westside Pregnancy Resource
Center, Emergency Contraception or Abortion?: About Abortion Pills, http://www.w-
cpc.org/sexuality/ecp.html (last visited Oct. 30, 2005) [hereinafter Westside] (summa-
rizing and comparing characteristics of the "morning-after pill" and the "abortion
pill").
59 Mifepristone is also known as RU-486, the abortion pill, Mifeprix, and
medical abortion. See Wendy Bennett et al., Pharmacists' Knowledge and the Diffi-
culty of Obtaining Emergency Contraception, 68 CONTRACEPTION 261, 261 (2003);
and Westside, supra note 58.
60 Prothro, supra note 57, at 718.
61 Id. at 718.
62 Herbe, supra note 33, at 80.
63 Westside, supra note 58.
64 Id.
65 Id.
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place roughly a week after intercourse.66 In most states, patients must
obtain a prescription from physicians before a pharmacist can dis-
pense EC.67 However, in New Hampshire,68 Washington, California,
Alaska, Hawaii, New Mexico, and Maine, pharmacists can distribute
EC without a prescription from a physician.69
First synthesized by a French scientist in 1980,70 mifepristone can
act as birth control, EC, or as an abortifacient.7' In 1989, the FDA
banned the importation of mifepristone,72 but in 2000, it was approved
as an abortifacient.73 Under current FDA restrictions, only physicians
and health clinics may distribute mifepristone, which means that
pharmacists play no role in its distribution.74 Consequently, mifepris-
tone is irrelevant for purposes of this Note.
Pharmacists' objections to contraception largely revolve around
when life and pregnancy begin.75 While some believe life begins at
conception or fertilization,7 6 others believe life begins at implanta-
66 Herbe, supra note 33, at 80; Wyser-Pratte, supra note 16, at 1131.
67 Herbe, supra note 33, at 81.
68 Tom Fahey, Lynch Signs Emergency Contraception Bill, UNION LEADER
(Manchester, N.H.), June 17, 2005, at A6.69 Tina R. Raine et al., Direct Access to Emergency Contraception through
Pharmacies and Effect on Unintended Pregnancy and STIs: A Randomized Con-
trolled Trial, 293 JAMA 54, 54 (2005).
70 Prothro, supra note 57, at 725.
71 Wyser-Pratte, supra note 16, at 1121.
72 Giannetti, supra note 20, at 699.
73 Herbe, supra note 33, at 78; RU 486/Mifepristone, http://www.naral.org/
Issues/ru486/index.cfn (last visited Oct. 30, 2005).
74 Herbe, supra note 33, at 82; Judith A. Johnson, Abortion: Termination of
Early Pregnancy with RU-486 (Mifepristone) (Congressional Research Serv.), Feb.
23, 2001, at summary page (unnumbered).
See Caroline Bollinger, Access Denied: Growing Numbers of Doctors and
Pharmacists Across the Country are Refusing to Prescribe or Dispense Birth Control
Pills. Here's Why, PREVENTION, Aug. 2004, at 151, 154, available at http:l/www.
prevention.com/article/0,5778,s 1 -1-93-35-4130-1,00.html ("At the heart of the debate
between anti-Pill forces and mainstream medicine lies a profound difference of opin-
ion about when pregnancy and life begin."); Herbe, supra note 33, at 85 ("The ambi-
guity of whether ECPs fit into the abortion debate is a result of a separate . . . ques-
tion: when human life begins."). But cf Ronald Dworkin, Life is Sacred. That's the
Easy Part, N.Y. TIMES MAG., May 16, 1993, at 36 (arguing that the abortion debate is
not a debate over when life begins, but about how best to respect life).
76 See Robert P. George, The Political Theory of the Culture of Death, in
CULTURE OF LIFE - CULTURE OF DEATH: PROCEEDINGS OF THE INTERNATIONAL
CONFERENCE ON 'THE GREAT JUBILEE AND THE CULTURE OF LIFE' 49, 66 (Luke Gor-
mally ed., 2002).
Unlike the gametes (that is, the sperm and egg), the zygote is genetically
unique and distinct from its parents. Biologically, it is a separate organism.
It produces, as the gametes do not, specifically human enzymes and pro-
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tion.77 For those who believe in the former, the fact that EC prevents
the implantation and survival of eggs after fertilization is equivalent to
murder. 78 In fact, one pharmacist went so far as to compare the phar-
maceutical termination of unborn life to the Nazi holocaust.79 Some
individuals also believe that all forms of contraception, including birth
control pills, are sinful.80 For some, contraception is immoral because
it promotes infidelity, endangers women, and contributes to the de-
generation of moral society,81 while others feel contraceptives devalue
the institution of motherhood, threaten the institution of marriage, and
devalue "the gift of fertility."
82
teins. It possesses, as they do not, the active capacity or potency to develop
itself into a human embryo, fetus, infant, child, adolescent, and adult.
Id.; Contraception, supra note 7, at 34; All Things Considered: Resignation of Ala-
bama Nurses over Objections to Administering the Morning-After Pill (National
Public Radio broadcast Jul. 28, 2004) [hereinafter All]; Herbe, supra note 33, at 86
("The Roman Catholic Church's official teaching and belief is that life begins, and
conception occurs, at fertilization."). For purposes of this Note, conception and fer-
tilization refer to the union of sperm and egg. See Karen L. Brauer, Selling the Pill,
http://www.pfli.org/brauersellingthepill.html (last visited Oct. 28, 2005) ("In com-
mon usage, conception is equated with fertilization ... ").
7 David A. Grimes, Mifepristone (RU 486) - An Abortifacient to Prevent
Abortion?, 328 NEw ENG. J. MED. 354, 355 (1993) ("The biologic fact is that preg-
nancy begins at implantation and not at fertilization."); Jeff McDonald, More Health
Professionals Balk at Giving Birth Control; Refusal to Prescribe, Dispense Increases;
Moral Grounds Cited, SAN DIEGO UNION-TRiB., Aug. 8, 2004, at A-1 ("For many, a
life starts the moment a sperm penetrates an egg; for others, it starts days later, once
the fertilized egg is implanted in the lining of a woman's uterus. Still others believe
life begins the moment a baby draws its first breath."). See Katha Pollitt, Special
Rights for the Godly?, NATION, June 24, 2002, at 10 ("[ECI is not abortion, because
until a fertilized egg implants in the womb, the woman is not pregnant.").
78 See Contraception, supra note 7, at 34; Simon, supra note 3 ("[T]hose
who believe life begins at conception view the high-dose hormones as baby killers,
since they can block fertilized eggs from implanting in the uterus."). There may also
be other reasons pharmacists refuse to fill a prescription. See Veatch, supra note 17,
1415 ("Pharmacists have refused to participate in medical research protocols and
treatments involving drugs... that they consider to be ineffective or fraudulent.").
79 Re: Ohio House Bill 68: Testimony Before Ohio House Health Committee,
(May 2004) (testimony of Robert Garbe, R.Ph.) available at http://www.
consciencelaws.org/Examining-Conscience-Issues/Legal/Articles/Legal22.htm [here-
inafter Ohio] (last visited Sept. 7, 2005).
80 See Gardner, supra note 7, at 11; Pollitt, supra note 77, at 10 ("Some anti-
choicers have long argued that not just EC but conventional birth control methods-
the pill, Norlpant, Depo-Provera and the 1UD-are 'abortifacients'....").
81 BRYAN HILLIARD, THE U.S. SUPREME COURT AND MEDICAL ETHICS: FROM
CONTRACEPTION TO MANAGED HEALTH CARE 35 (2004).
82 See Kateryna Fedoryka Cuddeback, Population Control: The Global Con-
tours of the Culture of Death, in CULTURE OF LIFE - CULTURE OF DEATH:
PROCEEDINGS OF THE INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE ON 'THE GREAT JUBILEE AND THE
CULTURE OF LIFE' 71, 87 (Luke Gormally ed., 2002) (describing "the destructive
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If abortion is defined as the termination of pregnancy, whether EC
constitutes an abortifacient or a contraceptive depends on the
definition of pregnancy. 83 According to the American College of
Obstetricians and Gynecologists, pregnancy begins with the
implantation of a fertilized egg in the womb. 4 This occurs after
fertilization, which takes several hours and involves several steps.
8 5
Several days after fertilization, the egg implants in the uterus, at
which point pregnancy begins.8 6 Under this "medical" definition,
abortion is the termination of a fertilized egg after implantation and
contraception is any procedure that prevents conception or terminates
the development of a fertilized egg prior to implantation.87 In contrast,
some identify pregnancy as "the union of the sperm and the ovum."
8
Under that definition, abortion is the termination of the egg at any
point following fertilization,89 while contraception is any procedure
that prevents fertilization.9" Based on either of these definitions, most
birth control pills and all barrier-method devices are contraceptives,
since they act before fertilization.9' Under the medical definition,
which holds that pregnancy begins with implantation, EC is a
contraceptive, 92 whereas under the second definition, which states that
pregnancy begins at fertilization, EC is an abortifacient insofar as it
prevents the implantation of a fertilized egg.
93
effect of contraception on marriage"); Helen Davies, Countering the Contraceptive
Mentality, in CULTURE OF LIFE - CULTURE OF DEATH: PROCEEDINGS OF THE
INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE ON 'THE GREAT JUBILEE AND THE CULTURE OF LIFE'
308, 312 (Luke Gormally ed., 2002).
83 Prothro, supra note 57, at 718.
84 Id. at 717; Brauer, supra note 76. See Herbe, supra note 33, at 86 (stating
that this is also the view adopted by the American Medical Association and several
medical dictionaries).
85 Prothro, supra note 57, at 717.
86 Id. at 717-18.
87 Id. at 718.
88 Id. (quoting Richard Glasgow, Education Director of the National Right to
Life Committee, quoted in Don Colbum, A Morning-After Pill: New Study Says RU-
486 Works Better than Current Methods, WASH. POST, Oct. 13, 1992, (§ Health,) at
7).
89 Id. at 718.
90 Id. See Brauer, supra note 76 ("The word 'contraception' can be found by
the lay person in Webster's New World Dictionary to mean the intentional prevention
of fertilization of the human ovum.").
91 Prothro, supra note 57, at 718.
92 See Pollitt, supra note 77, at 10 (stating that the American Medical Asso-
ciation, the American Medical Women's Association, the American College of Obste-
tricians and Gynecologists and the Harvard Medical School have stated that EC does
not constitute an abortifacient).
93 Herbe, supra note 33, at 85.
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Since the Supreme Court provides different standards of protec-
tion to abortion and contraception, the constitutionality of conscience
clauses directly depends on how courts define abortion, pregnancy,
and contraception.94 Courts have overwhelmingly adopted the medical
definition of pregnancy and the resulting definition of contraception
as the prevention of either fertilization or implantation. As a result,
EC should be afforded the same protection that other forms of contra-
ception enjoy under the Supreme Court's jurisprudence.
Although no case has explicitly held that postcoital contraceptives
are protected under the law of contraception, several cases illustrate
that postcoital contraception is properly characterized as contracep-
tion, not abortion.95 The language employed in two Supreme Court
cases, Webster v. Reproductive Health Services96 and Planned Par-
enthood of Southeastern Pennsylvania v. Casey,97 supports this posi-
tion. Justice O'Connor, concurring in Webster, which involved a chal-
lenge to a state abortion law, wrote, "[T]he use of postfertilization
contraceptive devices is constitutionally protected by Griswold and its
progeny.98 O'Connor's statement, if adopted by the Court, would
clearly protect EC as contraception.99 Similarly, the Court's opinion in
Casey indicates that postcoital contraceptives should be protected as
contraception: "Roe's scope is confined by the fact of its concern with
postconception potential life, a concern otherwise likely to be impli-
cated by some forms of contraception, protected independently under
Griswold and later cases."'100
Some federal and state courts have also adopted this position.101
Charles v. Carey'0 2 involved a challenge to a restrictive Illinois abor-
tion law that defined "abortifacient" very broadly. 10 3 The law in ques-
tion defined an abortifacient as "any instrument, medicine, drug, or
94 See Prothro, supra note 57, at 721 ("Unlike the right to contraception, a
woman's right to abortion can be regulated, and is anything but uncontroversial or
unchallenged.").
9 Id. at733 & n.127.
96 492 U.S. 490 (1989).
9' 505 U.S. 833 (1992).
98 492 U.S. at 523 (O'Connor, J., concurring). See also Wyser-Pratte, supra
note 16, at 1140 (identifying this language); Prothro, supra note 57, at 723 n.52 (iden-
tifying this language) ("Traditional and post-coital contraceptives are protected by the
Griswold line of cases.").
99 Justice O'Connor is often the swing vote on the Court.
10o Prothro, supra note 57, at 723 n.52 (quoting Planned Parenthood of South-
eastern Pennsylvania v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 859 (1992)).
101 Kari Hanson, Approval of RU-486 as a Postcoital Contraceptive, 17
PUGET SOUND L. REv. 163, 181-86 (1993) (discussing these cases).
102 627 F.2d 772 (7th Cir. 1980).
103 Id. at 789.
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... substance or device which is known to cause fetal death," and
defined fetus as "a human being from fertilization until birth."' 4 The
Seventh Circuit ruled that the broad definition of abortifacient "incor-
porates the IUD, a common form of birth control, which functions by
preventing implantation of the fertilized egg" and therefore interferes
with "the fundamental right to birth control.' '0 5 Margaret S. v. Ed-
wards106 involved a vagueness challenge to a Louisiana abortion law,
which defined abortion as "the deliberate termination of a human
pregnancy after fertilization of a female ovum ... . There, the
Eastern District of Louisiana wrote, "Abortion, as it is commonly un-
derstood, does not include ... the 'morning-after' pill, or ... birth
control pills. °10 8 The Western District of Wisconsin reached a similar
conclusion in Karlin v. Foust.10 9 The plaintiffs in Karlin v. Foust ex-
pressed concern that Wisconsin's abortion statute, which failed to
define pregnancy, would apply to EC. I0 Absent any legislative lan-
guage to the contrary, the court adopted the medical definition of
pregnancy:
The only reasonable way to read [the statute] is as adopting
the standard medical definition of pregnancy .... If the legis-
lature had chosen to depart from the standard definition, it
would have made that choice explicit. There is no reason to
assume that the legislature chose a minority definition when
the statutory text gives no indication of such a decision." 1
Finally, in Brownfield v. Daniel Freeman Marina Hospital,"2 a Cali-
fornia court held that EC did not constitute abortion and was therefore
not covered by the state's conscience clause." 3 Because several courts
have adopted the medical definition of pregnancy and chosen to treat
EC and birth control as contraceptives, EC and birth control should be
protected as contraceptives under the Constitution.
104 Id
105 Id.
106 488 F. Supp. 181 (E.D. La. 1980).
107 Id at 190.
'0' Id. at 191.
109 975 F. Supp. 1177 (W.D. Wis. 1997), aff'd on other grounds and rev'd on
other grounds, 188 F.3d 446 (7th Cir. 1999).
10 Id at 1228.
Id.
112 256 Cal. Rptr. 240 (Ct. App. 1989).
113 Id at 245 ("The conclusion that [EC] constitutes 'prevention,' i.e., birth
control, rather than 'termination,' i.e., abortion, is consistent with the above-cited
law.").
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There is some additional support for adopting the medical defini-
tion of pregnancy. For instance, according to one physician, defining
pregnancy from the point of conception can be conceptually awkward:
Fertilization is a necessary but insufficient step toward preg-
nancy.... For example, a couple ... might go to a clinic of-
fering in vitro fertilization.... If the procedure was success-
ful, the sperm and egg would unite in a petri dish. Could the
woman then announce to her ... neighbors that she was preg-
nant? Her fertilized egg [could] reside ... in a different ZIP
code. Not until the preembryo was successfully implanted in
her body would she become pregnant. The same holds true for
the fertilized egg traversing the fallopian tube.'
1 4
Furthermore, pregnancy is best measured by implantation, not fertili-
zation, because fertilized eggs do not always successfully implant:
[T]he notion that human life begins at fertilization does not
necessarily take biologic reality into account. For example, a
fertilized ovum may result in a hydatidiform mole or
choriocarcinoma, not a human being. Moreover, human
reproduction is inefficient. The majority of conceptions that
occur either do not implant in the uterus or are lost through
spontaneous abortion. Those of us alive today are the minority
who survived this biologic winnowing. Rather than being an
aberration of voluntary fertility control, the loss of zygotes is
common in human reproduction.115
Finally, because a pregnancy test will only identify a pregnancy after
implantation, there are also certain practical advantages to adopting
the medical definition.
1 1 6
In sum, the medical definition of pregnancy, which holds that
pregnancy does not begin until the fertilized egg implants in the
uterus, has been adopted by several courts and is supported by prag-
14 Brauer, supra note 76 (quoting Dr. David A. Grimes of San Francisco
General Hospital).
115 Grimes, supra note 77, at 355.
116 Bollinger, supra note 75, at 154. See Karlin v. Foust, 975 F. Supp. 1177,
1228 (W.D. Wis. 1997) ("[A]doption of [the definition of pregnancy that life begins
with conception] would create problems in determining whether a patient was preg-
nant because pregnancy cannot be detected until after implantation."); Cantor &
Baum, supra note 5, at 2009 ("[E]mergency contraception cannot fit squarely within
the concept of abortion because one cannot be sure that conception has occurred.").
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matic considerations. 1 7 Consequently, birth control and EC should be
evaluated under the Supreme Court's contraception jurisprudence.
B. Cases & Discussion
Three Supreme Court cases are pertinent to the constitutionality of
conscience clauses in the contraception context. This section will first
explain why Doe v. Bolton," 8 in which the Court upheld an abortion
conscience clause, does not necessarily protect pharmacist conscience
clauses involving contraception. It will then examine the cases that
articulate a constitutional right to contraception and explain why
pharmacist conscience clauses violate that right.
1. Doe v. Bolton Is Not Controlling
In Doe v. Bolton, the Supreme Court held a conscience clause
constitutionally viable in the abortion context. 119 In that case, a
twenty-two-year-old pregnant woman, along with nurses, social
workers, and physicians, challenged several provisions of a Georgia
statute, one of which contained a conscience clause protecting any
physician or hospital employee who refused to participate in an abor-
tion. 120 In upholding the conscience clause, the Court wrote, "[A] phy-
sician or any other employee has the right to refrain, for moral or reli-
gious reasons, from participating in the abortion procedure. These
provisions obviously are in the statute in order to afford appropriate
protection to the individual... and to the denominational hospital."'
121
Despite the Court's ruling in Bolton, it is not controlling in this
context for one reason: it involves abortions, not contraceptives. The
Court has afforded the right to access contraception a considerably
117 However, since the nonmedical or "religious" definition of pregnancy,
which holds that pregnancy begins at conception, is closer to the root of many phar-
macists' conscientious objection, perhaps it should be used as the standard for deter-
mining when pregnancy begins in the context of pharmacist conscience clauses. This
argument is unpersuasive. Pharmacists who refuse to dispense EC may object to it on
moral or religious grounds that have nothing to do with a particular definition of
pregnancy. Furthermore, many pharmacists do not believe EC is an abortifacient.
Therefore, it might be inappropriate for courts to adopt a nonmedical definition of
pregnancy that does not accurately reflect pharmacists' consciences. Additionally, as
described above, courts have chosen to adopt the medical definition of pregnancy.
Nonetheless, even if this position were adopted, birth control would still be protected
as contraception, since birth control constitutes contraception under both the medical
and nonmedical views.
18 410 U.S. 179 (1973).
19 See id. at 197-98.
120 See id. at 184-86, 205.
121 Id. at 197-98.
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higher level of protection than the right to an abortion. 22 For instance,
the right to access contraception is protected by strict scrutiny, which
holds that states may only restrict access to contraception if a compel-
ling state interest exists. 123 The right to have an abortion, by contrast,
is protected by the relatively weaker "undue burden" standard. Ac-
cording to the Supreme Court in Planned Parenthood of Southeastern
Pennsylvania v. Casey,124 an "undue burden" exists where "a state
regulation has the purpose or effect of placing a substantial obstacle in
the path of a woman seeking an abortion of a nonviable fetus."'
125
Commentators have noted that the "undue burden" standard applica-
ble to abortions is considerably weaker than the "strict scrutiny" stan-
dard governing contraceptives.1 26 Therefore, even if conscience
clauses are constitutional as they relate to abortion, this does not entail
that they are constitutional in the contraception context. Thus, Bolton
does not entail that pharmacist conscience clauses will survive consti-
tutional scrutiny.
2. Griswold & Carey
The Griswold line of cases, which includes Griswold v. Connecti-
cut and Carey v. Population Services International, established a
"relatively uncontroversial and unchallenged" right to use contracep-
tion127 In Griswold v. Connecticut, the Executive Director of the
Planned Parenthood League of Connecticut and a licensed physician
offered information and advice to married persons regarding the use
of contraceptives. 128 They were subsequently arrested and convicted
as accessories for violating a Connecticut law, which provided that
"[a]ny person who uses any drug, medicinal article or instrument for
122 However, the Court afforded abortions a much higher level of protection
when Doe v. Bolton was decided. See infra note 126.
123 Doe v. Bolton, 410 U.S. at 686.
124 505 U.S. 833 (1992).
125 Id. at 877.
126 See Annemarie Brennan, Note, Is All Privacy Created Equal?, 20 VT. L.
REv. 815, 830, 836 (1996).
[Roe v. Wade's trimester framework] effectively afforded early abortions
the same level of protection from state interference as contraception by re-
quiring strict judicial scrutiny of any state action which affected such deci-
sions. However, when the Court renounced the trimester framework and re-
placed strict scrutiny with an undue burden standard, it created disparate
levels of protection within its privacy jurisprudence.
Id. at 830 ("[In Planned Parenthood v. Casey, the Court] replaced strict scrutiny
with the less stringent 'undue burden' standard.").
127 Prothro, supra note 57, at 719.
128 381 U.S. 479, 480 (1965).
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the purpose of preventing conception shall be fined not less than fifty
dollars or imprisoned not less than sixty days nor more than one year
or be both fined and imprisoned."' 129 Appellants challenged their con-
victions, claiming the statute in question violated the Fourteenth
Amendment,13
0
Although the Supreme Court noted that "[w]e do not sit as a su-
per-legislature to determine the wisdom, need, and propriety of laws
that touch economic problems, business affairs, or social conditions,"
it felt the Connecticut law required special attention, for it "operate[d]
directly on an intimate relation of husband and wife and their physi-
cian's role in one aspect of that relation.' 31 The Court reasoned that
"specific guarantees in the Bill of Rights have penumbras, formed by
emanations from those guarantees that help give them life and sub-
stance."' 13 2 According to the Court, the guarantees of the First, Third,
Fourth, Fifth, and Ninth Amendments create "zones of privacy," or
"penumbral rights of 'privacy and repose."",133 The Court decided that
marriage lies within one such zone of privacy:
We deal with a right of privacy older than the Bill of Rights-
older than our political parties, older than our school system.
Marriage is a coming together for better or for worse, hope-
fully enduring, and intimate to the degree of being sacred. It is
an association that promotes a way of life. ... Yet it is an as-
sociation for as noble a purpose as any involved in our prior
decisions.
134
The Court found that the Connecticut law, by banning the use of
contraceptives, was "repulsive to the notions of privacy surrounding
the marriage relationship.' '135 It wrote, "[The Connecticut law], in
forbidding the use of contraceptives rather than regulating their
manufacture or sale, seeks to achieve its goals by means having a
maximum destructive impact upon [the marital] relationship."'136 Thus,
the Court held that states cannot constitutionally prohibit the use of
contraceptives by married persons and cannot prevent individuals
129 Id.
130 Id.
"' Id. at 482.
132 Id. at 484. For a definition of "penumbra," see LESLIE FRIEDMAN
GOLDSTEIN, CONTEMPORARY CASES IN WOMEN'S RIGHTS 10 (1994) ("A penumbra is a
kind of a hazy shadow around the edges of a thing.").
13' Griswold, 381 U.S. at 484-85.
134 Id. at 486.
135 Id.
136 Id. at 485 (emphasis in original).
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from providing married couples with contraceptives or information
regarding contraceptives.' 
37
Carey138 involved a New York law making
it. . . a crime (1) for any person to sell or distribute any con-
traceptive of any kind to a minor under the age of [sixteen]
years; (2) for anyone other than a licensed pharmacist to dis-
tribute contraceptives to persons [sixteen] or over; and (3) for
anyone, including licensed pharmacists, to advertise or dis-
play contraceptives.
139
Threatened with the possibility of prosecution, Population Planning
Associates, a business that sold nonprescription contraceptives
through the mail, challenged the constitutionality of the New York
law. 14
0
The Court's opinion began by noting that the Due Process Clause
of the Fourteenth Amendment recognizes a "fight of personal privacy,
or a guarantee of certain areas or zones of privacy. ' 141 The Court then
reiterated that contraception falls within this protected area: "While
the outer limits of this aspect of privacy have not been marked by the
Court, it is clear that among the decisions that an individual may make
without unjustified government interference are personal decisions
'relating to . . contraception. ,,,142 However, the Court acknowl-
edged that not all laws regulating contraception are impermissible:
That the constitutionally protected right of privacy extends to
an individual's liberty to make choices regarding contracep-
tion does not, however, automatically invalidate every state
regulation in this area. The business of manufacturing and
selling contraceptives may be regulated in ways that do not
infringe protected individual choices. And even a burdensome
regulation may be validated by a sufficiently compelling state
interest.
143
137 LAURENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1338 (2D ED. 1988)
(using Griswold to discuss what states can and cannot do regarding contraceptives).
138 Carey v. Population Services Int'l, 431 U.S. 678 (1977).
139 Id. at 681.
140 Id. at 682-84, 683 n.3.
141 Id. at 684 (quoting Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 152 (1973)).
142 Id. at 684-85 (quoting Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 12, and Eisenstadt
v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438, 453-54).
141 Id. at 685-86 (emphasis added).
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Thus, laws restricting an individual's right to access contraception
may be constitutional, provided they are narrowly drawn to serve a
compelling state interest.
144
The first part of the Court's analysis focused on the "wider restric-
tion on access to contraceptives created by ... [the statute's] prohibi-
tion of the distribution of nonmedical contraceptives to adults except
through licensed pharmacists. ' ' 145 According to the Court, Griswold,
when understood in the context of subsequent decisions, holds that
"the Constitution protects individual decisions in matters of childbear-
ing from unjustified intrusion by the State."'146 Therefore, while "there
is an independent fundamental 'right of access to contraceptives' ...
such access is essential to exercise of the constitutionally protected
right of decision in matters of childbearing that is the underlying
foundation of the holdings in Griswold, Eisenstadt v. Baird, and Roe
V. Wade.9
147
The Court realized that limiting the ability to distribute contracep-
tives to pharmacists imposed a significant burden on this right, and
though this significant burden was
not as great as that under a total ban on distribution ... the re-
striction of distribution channels to a small fraction of the to-
tal number of possible retail outlets renders contraceptive de-
vices considerably less accessible to the public, reduces the
opportunity for privacy of selection and purchase, and lessens
the possibility of price competition. 148
In other words, the Court made it clear that this provision, even
though it did not effect a total ban on access to contraception, bur-
dened a constitutionally protected right. The Court came to these con-
clusions in spite of a provision in the statute, like a "reverse con-
science clause," which allowed any pharmacist who did not own a
pharmacy or a registered store to dispense contraceptives "as [he] ...
deems proper in connection with his practice . ,,149 According to the
Court, that provision "obviously does not significantly expand the
number of regularly available, easily accessible retail outlets for non-
144 Id. at 686.
145 id.
146 Id. at 687.
141 Id. at 688-89.
148 Id. at 689-90.
149 Id. at 689 n.7.
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prescription contraceptives, and so has little relevance to our analysis
of this aspect of... [the statute]."1 50
Having concluded that the law implicated a constitutional right,
the Court proceeded to assess whether it furthered a compelling state
interest. It decided the law did not further the State's interests in pro-
tecting health or potential life, which, it noted, are not "implicated in
state regulation of contraceptives."' 5' Furthermore, the Court rejected
the following state interests as compelling: (1) "'a proper concern that
young people not sell contraceptives;' (2) 'allow[ing] purchasers to
inquire as to the relative qualities of varying products and prevents
anyone from tampering with them;' and (3) facilitat[ing] enforcement
of the other provisions of the statute."' 152 According to the Court, pre-
venting young people from selling contraceptives is not a compelling
state interest.1 53 Regardless, this interest was not promoted by the
New York law.' 54 The Court rejected the second state interest because
pharmacists are not qualified to evaluate the relative qualities of non-
medical contraceptives or prevent tampering with those products.
55
The Court held that the third purported state interest, administrative
ease, did not rise to the level of a compelling state interest.
56
Next, the Court considered the provision of the statute that prohib-
ited the distribution of contraceptives to those under the age of six-
teen. According to the Court, "Since the State may not impose a blan-
ket prohibition, or even a blanket requirement of parental consent, on
the choice of a minor to terminate her pregnancy, the constitutionality
of a blanket prohibition of the distribution of contraceptives to minors
is afortiori foreclosed."' 57 It rejected the possibility that the State has
a compelling interest in deterring minors' sexual activity. 158 Quoting
Eisenstadt, it wrote, "It would be plainly unreasonable to assume that
[the State] has prescribed pregnancy and the birth of an unwanted
child ... as punishment for fornication.' 1
59
Finally, the Court addressed the appellants' argument that because
the New York law did not completely ban access to contraceptives to
those under sixteen, it could not be found unconstitutional. 160 The law
150 Id.
151 Id. at 690.
152 Id. at 690.
'5 Id. at 690-9 1.
154 Id. at 691 n.10.
155 Id. at 691.
156 id.
... Id. at 694.
158 Id.
159 Id. at 695 (quoting Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438, 448 (1972)).
'60 Id. at 697.
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did not completely ban access to contraceptives because it contained a
physician exception, like the "reverse conscience clause" provision
discussed above, that allowed "[a]ny physician.., from supplying his
patients with such drugs as [he] ... deems proper in connection with
his practice."1 6' First, the Court noted that "less than total restrictions
on access to contraceptives that significantly burden the right to de-
cide whether to bear children must also pass constitutional scru-
tiny."' 162 Furthermore, the Court noted that the law "delegates the
State's authority to disapprove of minors' sexual behavior to physi-
cians, who may exercise it arbitrarily, either to deny contraceptives to
young people, or to undermine the State's policy of discouraging il-
licit early sexual behavior."'
' 63
Any state regulation restricting access to contraception must sat-
isfy strict scrutiny, i.e., it must further a compelling state interest and
be narrowly tailored to achieve that interest. Therefore, pharmacist
conscience clauses are unconstitutional if (1) they infringe on the right
to access contraception; (2) they do not further a compelling state
interest; and (3) if they do further a compelling state interest, they are
not narrowly tailored to achieve that interest.
a) Infringes on a Constitutional Right
No court has ever invalidated a conscience clause containing a
contraception exemption on constitutional grounds. 164 Nonetheless, as
the stories described at the beginning of this Note illustrate, pharma-
cists are restricting women's access to contraceptives by acting on
their consciences. Conscience clauses could further restrict women's
access to contraceptives by encouraging otherwise obedient pharma-
cists to act on their consciences and refuse to dispense or to refer pre-
scriptions for contraception. According to one commentator,
The greatest opposition to laws protecting the rights of con-
science of health care institutions has come from advocates of
absolute reproductive choice. These writers fear (probably
correctly) that if health care providers, including organiza-
tions, were entirely free to choose whether or not to provide
or participate in providing elective abortion services, there
161 Id.
162 Id.
163 Id. at 699.
164 See generally Wardle, supra note 3, at 199-217 (describing cases involv-
ing conscience clauses).
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would be fewer facilities in which such services would be
available.'
65
Similarly, providing legal immunity for conscientious objection could
provide the impetus for some pharmacists to refuse to dispense con-
traception, which in turn could restrict the availability of contracep-
tion for many women. 166 For some, a pharmacist's refusal could re-
strict any meaningful access to EC, which is only effective during a
limited amount of time.167 This problem could be particularly acute in
rural areas, where women could effectively have no access to contra-
ceptives if faced with an objecting pharmacist. 68 In fact, studies con-
firm that EC is easier to obtain in urban areas. 69 Inaccessibility may
165 Id. at 186.
166 Unfortunately, I have been unable to locate any studies that support the
proposition that conscience clauses would encourage otherwise obedient pharmacists
to refuse to dispense EC or refer prescriptions. Two studies have found, however, that
abortion-related conscience clauses do not affect the behavior of health care providers
in other contexts. See Steven S. Smugar et al., Informed Consent for Emergency Con-
traception: Variability in Hospital Care of Rape Victims, 90 AM. J. PUB. HEALTH
1372, 1373 (2000) (finding that hospital policies restricting information relating to EC
were not more prevalent in states with permissive abortion-related conscience
clauses) (also noting the study's limited sample size); and Reza Keshavarz et al.,
Emergency Contraception Provision: A Survey of Emergency Department Practitio-
ners, 9 AcAD. EMERGENCY MED. 69, 72 (2002) ("[Emergency department physicians]
from states with 'abortion-related consciousness clauses' were as likely to be willing
to provide EC as those residing in other states . .
167 Querido, supra note 39, at 3.
168 See Bennett et al., supra note 59, at 266 ("Because women who live in
rural areas are likely to have only one or two pharmacies near their homes, the lack of
access in rural pharmacies may pose significant obstacles."); Cantor & Baum, supra
note 5, at 2010.
[T]he refusal of a pharmacist to fill a prescription may place a dispropor-
tionately heavy burden on those with few options, such as a poor teenager
living in a rural area that has a lone pharmacy. Whereas the savvy subur-
banite can drive to another pharmacy, a refusal to fill a prescription for a
less advantaged patient may completely bar her access to medication.
Id.; Bruce D. Weinstein, Do Pharmacists Have a Right to Refuse to Fill Prescriptions
for Abortifacient Drugs?, 20 L.MED. & HEALTH CARE 220, 221 (1992) ("[Plregnant
women in rural settings might not have anyone else to turn to, should their pharma-
cists refuse to honor prescriptions for abortifacient drugs."); Jacobson & Kovach,
supra note 44, at IA; McDonald, supra note 77; and Simon, supra note 3. Cf
Dresser, supra note 26, at 281 ("Women seeking [abortions] may be substantially
burdened by the costs, the travel, and the time away from their jobs and families that
can accompany performance of the service."). Additionally, Wal-Mart pharmacies do
not carry EC. Consequently, its dominance in rural areas could rob women of the
ability to receive EC. See Gardner, supra note 7, at 11.
169 See Bennett et al., supra note 59, at 266.
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also be heightened for adolescents 170 and the poor, who are unable "to
shop around."' 7' According to the executive director of NARAL Pro-
Choice Wisconsin, "If we let pharmacists pick and choose which pre-
scriptions they're going to honor, you basically invalidate that health-
care for large numbers of people....,,17 z Put differently, without "rea-
sonable access," the constitutional right to control reproductive choice
via contraception may become "an empty right."'173 Although pharma-
cist conscience clauses may effect a less-than-absolute ban on access
to contraception in many situations, the Carey Court noted that laws
that entrust the distribution of contraception to the discretion of a lim-
ited number of pharmacists may unconstitutionally burden the right to
access contraception. 174 Therefore, pharmacist conscience clauses
infringe on a constitutional right by burdening women's access to
contraception.
b) No Compelling State Interest
Because pharmacist conscience clauses infringe on a constitu-
tional right relating to contraception, whether or not that infringement
is permissible depends on whether it serves a compelling state inter-
est. There is no compelling state interest in protecting pharmacists'
consciences, life prior to implantation, or the ethical integrity of the
pharmaceutical profession. In other words, although pharmacist con-
science clauses may advance several state interests, these interests,
however strong, do not rise to the level of compelling state interests
that justify infringing on the right to access contraception. Since
pharmacist conscience clauses do not advance any compelling state
170 Lee Ann E. Conard et al., Pharmacists' Attitudes Toward and Practices
with Adolescents, 157 ARCHIVES PEDIATRICS & ADOLESCENT MED. 361, 364-65
(2003) ( "[o]f pharmacists who do stock and dispense emergency contraception to
adolescent women, many feel uncomfortable providing this service") ("[pharmacist]
refusal is likely to serve as a barrier to access for adolescents, especially when emer-
gency contraception is not universally available").
171 Brownfield v. Daniel Freeman Marina Hosp., 256 Cal. Rptr. 240, 243
(Cal. Ct. App. 1989) ("She describes herself as a 'consumer of the most tragic sort...
in need of special emergency services. .. not in a position to shop around, or to edu-
cate herself as to the medical ramifications of rape, and the treatment options avail-
able to her ... unsophisticated and entitled to receive optimal care ... '). See Cantor
& Baum, supra note 5, at 2010.
172 Gardner, supra note 7, at 11. See Sweeney, supra note 6, at El (stating that
opponents of Ohio's pharmacist conscience clause "fear it would limit access to
emergency contraceptives and birth control").
173 Dresser, supra note 26, at 280.
174 Carey v. Population Services Int'l, 431 U.S. 678, 689 n.7 (1977).
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interests, they must be struck down insofar as they restrict access to
contraception.
The most obvious interest promoted by conscience clauses is the
interest in "giving healthcare workers the freedom to follow their con-
science and protecting them from forced participation."'' 75 However,
there is no compelling state interest in the moral or religious con-
sciences of pharmacists. 176 The Alaska Supreme Court has held there
is no compelling state interest in the conscience rights of a hospital.
177
In Valley Hospital Ass 'n v. Mat-Su Coalition for Choice,'78 the Alaska
Supreme Court evaluated the validity of two conscience clauses under
the Alaska Constitution. The Alaska Supreme Court noted that under
the Alaska Constitution, "reproductive rights are fundamental" and
"may be legally constrained only when the constraints are justified by
a compelling state interest. . . ,,179 The court concluded that the rights
of conscience of individuals and institutions, protected by statute, are
not compelling state interests and cannot supersede the right to an
abortion, which is constitutionally guaranteed. 80 It struck down the
conscience clause as unconstitutional under the Alaska Constitu-
tion.' 8' This case involved the conscience rights of medical institu-
tions, which are arguably weaker than the conscience rights of indi-
vidual health care providers, such as pharmacists. Nonetheless, while
pharmacists, like health care institutions, may have a statutory inter-
175 Freedom to Refuse, http://www.pfli.org/alarcon freedom to refusev2.
html (last visited Oct. 28, 2005). See Testimony, supra note 42 (statement of Paula
Koch, licensed pharmacist) ("[The proposed conscience clause] gives health care
professionals the freedom to make difficult choices without fear of demotion or ter-
mination."); and Wardle, supra note 3, at 181 ("the basic principles underlying the
extension of any such protection-respect for constraints of individual conscience,
care for the conscience rights of minorities, and commitment to the value (and the
belief in the feasibility) of accommodation"). However, relatively little attention is
given to the interests of nonobjecting employers who mistakenly hire objecting phar-
macists and are thus victims of their beliefs because of a conscience clause. See Pol-
litt, supra note 77, at 10 (criticizing the ACLU's view that "secular institutions should
be sitting ducks for any fanatic who can get hired even provisionally").
176 But see Irene Prior Loftus, Note, I Have a Conscience, Too: The Plight of
Medical Personnel Confronting the Right to Die, 65 NOTRE DAME L. REv. 699, 719
n. 150 (1990) ("[A] compelling state interest is served by protecting the consciences of
medical personnel ... ").
177 See Maureen Kramlich, The Abortion Debate Thirty Years Later: From
Choice to Coercion, 31 FORDHAM URn. L.J. 783, 790 (2004) (arguing that abortion
has gone from a "choice" to a state of coercion, whereby physicians must perform
them).
178 948 P.2d 963 (Alaska 1997).
179 Id. at 969.
... Id. at 972.
181 Id.
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est'82 in their consciences, this right, according to the Valley Hospital
court, must yield to any constitutional rights, such as the right to ac-
cess contraception. 1
83
The second possible interest served by pharmacist conscience
clauses is an interest in protecting life before implantation. However,
courts have not found a compelling state interest in life at such an
early point in development. In Planned Parenthood of Southeastern
Pennsylvania v. Casey,184 the Supreme Court held that a compelling
state interest exists in an embryo only once the embryo reaches viabil-
ity. 85 The Casey Court stated, "[A] State may not prohibit any woman
from making the ultimate decision to terminate her pregnancy before
viability."'186 Since it is unlikely medical technology will ever be able
to push viability to conception or even before implantation, an unim-
planted egg does not warrant a compelling state interest.
1 87
182 The First Amendment does not protect pharmacists' consciences. Cf
Wardle, supra note 3, at 216 ("Under [Employment Division v.] Smith [494 U.S. 872
(1990)], neither patients nor health care providers can expect courts to extend any first
amendment protection against laws, judicial doctrines, or government policies... that
incidentally violate their strong religious or moral beliefs."). Moreover, it is question-
able whether the consciences of health care providers were constitutionally protected
before Smith. Katherine A. White, Crisis of Conscience: Reconciling Religious
Health Care Providers' Beliefs and Patients' Rights, 51 STAN. L. REV. 1703, 1728
(1999).
183 948 P.2d at 972. ("The legislature, however, may not balance statutory
rights against constitutional ones, like the right to an abortion.").
fM 505 U.S. 833 (1992).
185 Susan Tall, Legal and Ethical Implications of Human Procreative Clon-
ing, 3 J. L. & Soc. CHALLENGES 25, 43 (1999).
186 505 U.S. at 879 (emphasis added).
187 See Clifton Perry & L. Kristen Schneider, Cryopreserved Embryos: Who
Shall Decide Their Fate?, 13 J. LEGAL MED. 463, 476 (1992).
[I]f the state is allowed to proscribe elective abortions at the point of fetal
viability and medical science is capable of pushing fetal viability back to
conception, the state would enjoy a compelling state interest in fetal life at
conception and thus be entitled to proscribe all elective abortions. Medical
technology, however, is doubtfully capable of reducing the point of fetal vi-
ability much beyond the twenty-second week, at least at this time. Accord-
ing to most medical experts, the fetal renal and pulmonary systems are too
immature to sustain fetal existence prior to that time.
Id. Cf Susan Tall, Academic Analysis: Legal and Ethical Implications of Human
Procreative Cloning, 3 J. L. & Soc. CHALLENGES 25, 44 (1999) (making this argu-
ment with respect to cloned embryos outside a woman's body). However, in Webster
v. Reproductive Health Services, 492 U.S. 490 (1989), Justice Rehnquist stated,
"[t]here is ... no reason why the State's compelling interest in protecting potential
human life should not extend throughout pregnancy rather than coming into existence
only at the point of viability." Id. at 493. Thus, the Webster decision suggests that
there may be a compelling state interest in protecting potential life before implanta-
tion. See Perry & Schneider, supra, at 477. See also Philip J. Prygoski, The Implica-
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The state might also have an interest in promoting and protecting
the "ethical integrity of the pharmaceutical profession." In several
"right to die" cases, the Supreme Court 188 and several lower courts
1 89
have recognized that states have an interest in the ethical integrity of
the medical profession. However, this does not necessarily entail that
states have a similar interest in protecting the integrity of the pharma-
ceutical profession. In order for states to have this interest with respect
to pharmacists, pharmacy must be a profession. Although pharmacy is
not one of the traditional medieval professions, such as medicine,
clergy, or the law, it partakes of five attributes essential to any profes-
sion: (1) a systematic body of theory; (2) professional authority; (3)
sanction of the community; (4) a code of ethics; and (5) a professional
culture.' 90 Since pharmacy may be a profession, there might be a state
interest in protecting its ethical integrity.
Nonetheless, any right of conscientious refusal physicians have
does not entail that pharmacists have similar rights, since pharmacists
have less decision-making ability than physicians. 191 For instance,
physicians can prescribe medications, while pharmacists cannot.
19 2
This increased level of decision-making ability entails increased ac-
countability and morally distinguishes physicians from pharmacists.
1 93
Furthermore, any purported state interest in the ethical integrity of
the pharmaceutical profession is unlikely to rise to the level of a com-
pelling state interest. In Washington v. Glucksberg,'94 the Court held
that the state interest in the ethical integrity of the medical profession
is sufficient to satisfy a rational basis review.195 However, this does
tions of Davis v. Davis for Reproductive Rights Analysis, 61 TENN. L. REv. 609, 616
n.59 (1994) (noting that an embryo's uniqueness creates concern over describing it as
property). Since this dicta is not controlling, there is no compelling state interest in
life before viability.
188 See Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 731 (1997).
189 See, e.g., Brophy v. New England Sinai Hosp., Inc., 497 N.E.2d 626, 634
(Mass. 1986) (noting four countervailing state interests, including the maintenance of
ethical integrity in the medical profession); Satz v. Perlmutter, 362 So.2d 160, 163
(Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1978); and Superintendent of Belchertown State Sch. v.
Saikewicz, 370 N.E.2d 417, 426 (Mass. 1977) (noting the interest in maintaining
ethical integrity in the medical profession).
190 See William E. Fassett & Andrew C. Wicks, Is Pharmacy a Profession?,
in ETHICAL IssuEs IN PHARMACY 1, 6-10 (Bruce D. Weinstein ed., 1996).
191 Weinstein, supra note 168, at 221.
192 Kenneth Mullan & Bruce D. Weinstein, Do Pharmacists Have a Right to
Refuse to Fill Prescriptions for Abortifacient Drugs?, in ETHICAL ISSUES IN
PHARMAcY 175, 184 (Bruce D. Weinstein, ed. 1996).
193 Id.
194 521 U.S. 702 (1997).
'9' See id. at 731.
[Vol. 16:237
2006] THE UNCONSCIONABILITY OF CONSCIENCE CLA USES 265
not entail that states have a compelling interest in the ethical integrity
of the medical profession needed to satisfy strict scrutiny, which is the
standard applicable to contraception cases. Therefore, even if states
have a legitimate interest in the ethical integrity of the pharmaceutical
profession, it may not be strong enough to satisfy strict scrutiny.
Even if there is a compelling state interest in the ethical integrity
of the pharmaceutical profession, it would probably weigh against
expanding a pharmacist's right to refuse to dispense contraception.
96
There are at least four models of professionalism, three of which re-
quire objecting pharmacists to refer or dispense contraception or
EC. 197 Under the libertarian model, which does not recognize a basic
right to health care, a pharmacist has no moral duty to dispense or
refer prescriptions unless she is contractually bound to do so. 198 This
model values autonomy and nonmaleficence, which holds that an in-
dividual should avoid harming others. 199 Ironically, a pharmacist's
refusal to dispense contraception may harm female patients while
compromising their autonomy.
The technician model, in contrast, holds that a pharmacist is no
more than a puppet and must dispense any prescription written by a
physician.00 Under this model, a pharmacist has virtually no auton-
omy. In other words, the technician model requires that pharmacists
dispense any prescription for contraception or EC as long as the pa-
tient has a valid prescription, regardless of whether the pharmacist
objects.
The third model is the guild model. According to this model, a
pharmacist must follow the dictates of the profession.20' In other
words, if the pharmaceutical profession allows for conscientious
objection, then a pharmacist may refuse to dispense contraception or
EC.2°2 The professional obligations imposed on pharmacists illustrate
that while pharmacists do enjoy a limited right of conscientious
196 Similarly, the state interest in the ethical integrity of the medical profes-
sion has not always weighed against the "right to die." See Superintendent of Belcher-
town State Sch. v. Saikewicz, 370 N.E.2d 417, 426-27 (Mass. 1977) ("Recognition of
the right to refuse necessary medical treatment in appropriate circumstances is consis-
tent with exiting medical mores; such a doctrine does not threaten... the integrity of
the medical profession .. "); Satz v. Perlmutter, 362 So. 2d 160, 163 (Fla. Dist. Ct.
App. 1978).
197 See Mullan & Weinstein, supra note 192, at 182-83 (describing four mod-
els of professionalism).
19' Id. at 182, 187.
199 Id. at 185.
200 Id. at 182.
201 Id.
202 Id.
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objection, it is not absolute. Professional obligations dictate that
pharmacists should dispense contraceptives even if it violates their
consciences. As professionals, pharmacists are expected to put their
clients' interests above their own.2 °3 The American Pharmaceutical
Association's (APhA) Code of Ethics states that "'a pharmacist
promotes the good of every patient in caring, compassionate, and
confidential manner,' 'a pharmacist respects the autonomy and dignity
of each patient,' and 'a pharmacist serves individual, community, and
societal needs.'" 204 The Code also states,
A pharmacist promotes the right of self-determination and
recognizes individual self-worth by encouraging patients to
participate in decisions about their health.... In all cases, a
pharmacist respects personal and cultural differences among
patients.... A pharmacist has a duty to tell the truth and to
act with conviction of conscience. A pharmacist avoids dis-
criminatory practices, behavior or work conditions that impair
professional judgment, and actions that compromise dedica-
tion to the best interests of patients.
20 5
The APhA has also adopted a conscience clause, which states,
"APhA recognizes the individual pharmacist's right to exercise con-
scientious refusal and supports the establishment of systems to ensure
patient's [sic] access to legally prescribed therapy without compro-
mising the pharmacist's right of conscientious refusal. 20 6 According
to the APhA,
Pharmacists choosing to excuse themselves from such a situa-
tion continue to have a responsibility to the patient--ensuring
that the patient will be referred to another pharmacist or be
channeled into another available health system ... the patient
should not be required to abide by the pharmacist's personal,
moral decision.20 7
203 Cantor & Baum, supra note 5, at 2009.
204 Id.
205 American Pharmacists Association, Code of Ethics for Pharmacists,
http://www.aphanet.org/lead/hod.htmi (last visited Oct. 28, 2005).
206 C. Edwin Webb, A Pharmacist's Conscience & Quality Patient Care, AM.
C. CLINICAL PHARMACY, available at http://www.accp.com/report/rptO805/artO5.php
(last visited Oct. 28, 2005) (discussing the APhA's stance on conscientious refusal).
207 Cay Crow, Pharmacists Should Not Decide Who Can Receive Birth Con-
trol, NARAL PRO-CHOICE TEX., Dec. 11 2004, available at http://www.prochoicetexas.
org/s04politicalupdates/press/200412111 .shtml. Cf. R. Alta Charo, The Celestial Fire
of Conscience - Refusing to Deliver Medical Care, 352 NEw ENG. J. MED. 2471,
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Thus, according to the guidelines of the pharmaceutical profession,
while pharmacists do have a limited right of conscientious objection,
this right must never compromise the patient's ability to receive medi-
cation. In other words, under the guild model, conscience clauses that
do not ensure that women receive access to contraception do not pro-
mote or protect the ethical integrity of the pharmaceutical profession.
The societal model, the fourth model of professionalism, also
weighs in favor of dispensing contraception. According to the societal
model, pharmacists may only refuse to dispense a drug when refusal is
endorsed by society. 20 8 Because studies show that society frowns upon
pharmacists' refusal to dispense drugs, this model does not favor
conscientious objection. According to one study, 88 percent of the
general public objects to allowing pharmacists to refuse to dispense
prescriptions. 20 9 A CBS/New York Times poll found that 78 percent of
Americans believe pharmacists who object to birth control should not
be able to refuse to dispense it.210 Because society does not support a
pharmacist's right to refuse, pharmacist conscience clauses do not
promote the ethical integrity of the pharmaceutical profession. In sum,
three out of four models of professionalism do not support pharmacist
conscience clauses. Therefore, pharmacist conscience clauses do not
promote or protect the ethical integrity of the pharmaceutical
profession.
There is no compelling state interest furthered by pharmacist con-
science clauses.211 Courts do not recognize a compelling state interest
in pharmacists' consciences or in life prior to implantation. It is un-
clear whether the ethical integrity of the pharmaceutical profession
2473 (2005) (stating that this "is the approach taken by virtually all the major medi-
cal, nursing, and pharmacy societies.").
208 Mullan & Weinstein, supra note 192, at 183, 186.
For example, the duty to rescue is not strong enough to require laypersons
to enter a burning building to save someone's life. However, firefighters do
have such an obligation, and we would say that a firefighter who refused to
perform such an action was acting unethically because he or she has made a
promise to society to assume a greater degree of risk than laypersons must
assume.
Id.
209 See Protecting, supra note 39, at 19 (statement of Catherine Weiss, Direc-
tor, American Civil Liberties Union, Reproductive Freedom Project).
210 See Religion, supra note 43.
211 But cf. William W. Bassett, Private Religious Hospitals: Limitations Upon
Autonomous Moral Choices in Reproductive Medicine, 17 J. CONTEMP. L. & POL'Y
455, 544 (2001) (arguing that because religious hospitals will pull out of the heath
care industry in the absence of conscience clauses, "protection of the rights of con-
science of religiously-motivated health care providers is a compelling state interest.
There is no equally compelling state interest in destroying this right").
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merits a compelling state interest. Even if states have a compelling
interest in protecting and promoting the ethical integrity of the phar-
maceutical profession, this interest is not served by pharmacist con-
science clauses. Because pharmacist conscience clauses infringe on a
constitutionally protected right and do not advance a compelling state
interest, they are unconstitutional.
c) Not Narrowly Tailored
Even if a compelling state interest existed in pharmacists'
consciences, in life before implantation, or in the ethical integrity of
the pharmaceutical profession, pharmacist conscience clauses are not
narrowly tailored to advance any of those interests and therefore do
not satisfy strict scrutiny. Pharmacist conscience clauses are not
narrowly tailored to promote a state interest in protecting pharmacists'
consciences for two reasons. First, pharmacist conscience clauses do
not protect the consciences of pharmacists who do not object to
dispensing contraception. These pharmacists are equally deserving of
protection.212 Conceivably, situations could arise where pharmacists'
consciences are threatened not because of their refusal to fill
prescriptions, but because of their desire to do so. Second, pharmacist
conscience clauses that only allow pharmacists to refuse to dispense
contraceptives or abortifacients, such as those in Arkansas, Georgia,
and South Dakota, do not fully protect pharmacists' consciences.
Pharmacists may object to filling a prescription on a number of
grounds, many of which may be inapplicable to birth control or EC.
For instance, a pharmacist may refuse to fill a prescription because
she feels it is immoral on some other grounds213 or because the drug
or dosage is unsafe.214 Therefore, pharmacist conscience clauses are
not narrowly tailored to protect pharmacists' consciences.
Additionally, pharmacist conscience clauses are not narrowly tai-
lored to advance a state interest in life before implantation. Pharmacist
conscience clauses that allow pharmacists to refuse to dispense all
212 See Allen & Brushwood, supra note 46, at 16.
[C]onsideration of a professional's personal moral convictions should not
be limited to the scenario of allowing objectors to opt out of their organiza-
tion's prevalent practice. Professionals, including pharmacists, whose con-
victions lead them to feel a sense of obligation to provide a controversial
service are no less deserving of consideration than those who consider the
service morally reprehensible.
Id.
213 See infra notes 79-81.
214 For a discussion of pharmacists' legal duty to dispense a high dose or
potentially risky drug, see Brushwood & Lively, supra note 34.
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objectionable prescriptions or contraceptives are obviously not nar-
rowly tailored to prevent pharmacists from dispensing EC, which im-
plicates life before implantation. Therefore, in order to be narrowly
tailored to advance a state interest in protecting life before implanta-
tion, pharmacist conscience clauses must only prohibit pharmacists
from dispensing drugs, such as EC, which implicate life before im-
plantation. Furthermore, in addition to being overly broad, pharmacist
conscience clauses are in many ways too narrow. First, pharmacist
conscience clauses arbitrarily entrust the protection of this state inter-
est to individual pharmacists, many of whom will not object to dis-
pensing EC and will therefore not protect the putative state interest in
life before implantation. Second, for some pharmacists, referring an
objectionable prescription may break the chain of causation that deters
pharmacists from dispensing EC in the first place.21 5 In other words,
pharmacist conscience clauses that allow pharmacists to refer objec-
tionable prescriptions may not protect life before implantation, since
many women will still be able to obtain EC through a referral. States
could better protect this interest by enacting wholesale prohibitions on
the sale and production of EC.
Finally, pharmacist conscience clauses are not narrowly tailored
to protect the ethical integrity of the pharmaceutical profession. In
fact, as the discussion in Section II(B) illustrates, pharmacist con-
science clauses are probably antithetic to the ethical integrity of the
pharmaceutical profession. Therefore, pharmacist conscience clauses
are not narrowly tailored to advance a state interest in protecting and
promoting the ethical integrity of the pharmaceutical profession.
d) Pharmacist Conscience Clauses are Unconstitutional
Because pharmacist conscience clauses do not advance any com-
pelling state interest and are not narrowly tailored to advance a com-
pelling state interest, they unconstitutionally burden the right to repro-
ductive choice by restricting women's access to contraceptives. This
legislation restricts access to contraception by encouraging pharma-
cists who would otherwise dispense contraception to act on their be-
liefs and refuse to fill prescriptions for contraception. However, the
unconstitutionality of pharmacist conscience clauses does not mean
that pharmacists in private 'practice are acting unconstitutionally when
they refuse to dispense contraceptives. As one author noted, "For pa-
tients to make a due process argument that they have a fundamental
right to health care services, the entity acting to deny them services
215 id.
269
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must be the state itself or a quasi-governmental entity. 216 Nonethe-
less, legislation which provides legal protection to those individuals is
unconstitutional.
III. PROPOSAL
In their current form, pharmacist conscience clauses are unconsti-
tutional. This section proposes how pharmacist conscience clauses can
be improved to ensure their constitutionality and afford women
greater access to contraception. Any remedy should strike a balance
between pharmacists' rights of conscience and women's access to
contraceptives. 217 This section examines several proposed changes to
conscience clauses and concludes that requiring mandatory distribu-
tion or referral is the only tenable solution, since it is the only solution
that preserves meaningful access to contraception.
One proposed solution is to require rigorous notice requirements,
whereby pharmacies must post signs and schedules indicating when
objecting pharmacists are on duty or when contraception will or will
not be available.218 A variation of this notice requirement would re-
quire objecting pharmacists to inform physicians of their refusal be-
fore the physician issues a prescription. 1 9 While these solutions
would probably ensure access to contraception in most cases, they
might not improve access to contraception in rural or impoverished
areas. Undoubtedly, providing notice would be informative to poten-
tial customers. However, notice alone will not increase likelihood of
obtaining contraception for women who do not have the time or
means to travel to another pharmacy. In these situations, women who
are constrained by time, money, or distance may be unable to reach a
216 White, supra note 182, at 1734.
217 See Herbe, supra note 33, at 101 ("In any event, an effective conscience
statute should take into consideration many complex issues including broad protection
against recriminatory action, efficient administration of pharmacies, and accommoda-
tion of patients."). If objecting pharmacists are forced en masse to distribute contra-
ceptives against their will, they may decide to leave the pharmaceutical market alto-
gether, which could be disastrous for the health care industry and patients. Cf Bassett,
supra note 211, at 544 (making this argument with respect to private religious hospi-
tals). Failing to protect pharmacists' consciences could also deter future pharmacists
from entering the profession. Ohio, supra note 79 (testimony of Karen Brauer, M.S.,
R.Ph.).
218 Herbe, supra note 33, at 101.
219 Querido, supra note 39, at 3. A similar proposal would require physicians
to identify willing pharmacists before issuing prescriptions. See Bennett et al., supra
note 59, at 266. That proposal, like the proposed notice requirements, would probably
be very effective, but would be unhelpful if women needing EC were unable to reach
a willing pharmacist.
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willing pharmacist. 2 0 Therefore, notice may not meaningfully in-
crease access to contraception for some women.
Forcing transfer of patients is another potential solution. 221 The
APhA's conscience clause, for instance, allows pharmacists to refuse
to dispense medication to which they have personal objections, but
requires objecting pharmacists to refer patients to a willing pharma-
2223cist. 22 Referrals have also been endorsed by the APhA.223 However,
this may be an unsatisfactory solution for some objecting pharmacists:
"For many pharmacists, a referral would be no more than a passive
participation in the activity they initially refused to actively assist.,
224
Currently, four jurisdictions allow pharmacists to refuse to dispense
"information" regarding contraception, which could include a refusal
to refer a patient to a willing pharmacist.225 Statutes could effect a*
220 The American College of Obstetrician-Gynecologists suggests that physi-
cians provide patients with advance prescriptions for EC during regular appointments.
Bennett et al., supra note 59, at 266. This proposal, by providing women with more
time to locate willing pharmacists, would undoubtedly mitigate women's inability to
access contraception. However, even with an advance prescription, some women may
still be unable reach a willing pharmacist in time.
221 See Cantor & Baum, supra note 5, at 2011; Patricia Lee, Position 1:
Pharmacist Should Dispense the Drug, in Pharmacy Ethics, Pharmacist's Refusal to
Dispense Diethylstilbestrolfor Contraceptive Use, 46 AM. J. Hosp. PHARMACY 1413,
1414 (1989) ("If [a pharmacist] cannot bring himself to dispense [a] drug, he should
call another pharmacist to the hospital to dispense the drug in his place."); and Ve-
atch, supra note 17, at 1415. Cf Judith F. Daar, A Clash at the Bedside: Patient
Autonomy v. A Physician's Professional Conscience, 44 HASTINGS L.J. 1241, 1266
(1993) (stating that while courts have typically respected physicians' consciences,
when patient autonomy and physician's conscience collide, courts have ordered com-
pliance with the patient's requests or transfer to a physician who is willing to perform
the objectionable service).
222 Herbe, supra note 33, at 88-89.
223 Cantor & Baum, supra note 5, at 2011 ("[P]roviding alternative mecha-
nisms for patients ... ensures patient access to drug products, without requiring the
pharmacist or the patient to abide by personal decisions other than their own.").
224 Herbe, supra note 33, at 89, 99 ("For many pharmacists referral would be
no less in conflict with their moral convictions than actually distributing ECPs."). One
pharmacist likened referral to the following situation: "That's like saying, 'I don't kill
people myself but let me tell you about the guy down the street who does.' What's
that saying? 'I will not off your husband, but I know a buddy who will?' It's the same
thing .. " Rob Stein, Pharmacists' Rights at Front of New Debate; Because of Be-
liefs, Some Refuse to Fill Birth Control Prescriptions, WASH. POST, Mar. 28, 2005, at
A01. See also Charo, supra note 207, at 2471 ("[E]ven a referral, in their view, makes
one complicit in the objectionable act .....
5 Herbe, supra note 33, at 99. A pharmacist's refusal to provide information
about contraception could also restrict access. Cf Protecting, supra note 39, at 14
(statement of Catherine Weiss, Director, American Civil Liberties Union, Reproduc-
tive Freedom Project).
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forced transfer by establishing a formal, institutional body to oversee
pharmacists, assess conflicts between patients and pharmacists, and
make appropriate recommendations, such as transfers, when neces-
sary.226 Conceivably, requiring a pharmacist to refer a prescription to
which she objects might infringe on the patient's privacy interest in
protecting her medical information. However, given the relatively
weak constitutional protection afforded to that interest, it is unlikely
this would create any problems for mandatory referrals.227 While
mandatory referral is an attractive solution, it will be ineffective
where referral to a willing pharmacist is impractical. Referral will be
impractical where women seeking contraception are unable to reach a
willing pharmacist. Obviously, this will be a problem for women in
rural and impoverished areas. Additionally, given the narrow time
frame in which EC is effective, some women may not be able to find a
willing pharmacist in time.
Another potential solution is to exempt medical emergencies from
conscience clauses, a position which some states have adopted. 28
Currently, none of the conscience clauses explicitly protecting phar-
macists contain a medical emergency exemption. 229 This solution
would only protect access to contraception if all forms of prescription
contraception were treated as related to medical emergencies. In other
words, rape, contraceptive failure, and consensual sexual intercourse
would have to be considered medical emergencies for this solution to
ensure access to contraception. This is unlikely, since medical emer-
Consider, for example, the hypothetical case of a low-income woman in
Washington State who has just been raped. The police take her to a local
emergency room in a large, urban catholic hospital. State law in Washing-
ton requires hospitals to offer all rape victims emergency contraception so
that they can prevent a pregnancy resulting from the assault. The hospital,
however, believes that emergency contraception is an abortifacient, so rely-
ing on H.R. 4691 the hospital refuses to provide or even inform the patient
about emergency contraception. She leaves not knowing that this drug ex-
ists.
Id.
226 See Daar, supra note 221, at 1280-88 (adopting this approach with respect
to physicians, modeled after the American Bar Association's Model Rules of Profes-
sional Conduct, whereby hospitals would create treatment evaluation boards (TEBs)
to oversee physician-patient disputes).
227 See Grace-Marie Mowery, Comment, A Patient's Right of Privacy in
Computerized Pharmacy Records, 66 U. CIN. L. REv. 697, 702-11 (1998) (describing
the privacy interest in pharmacy records).
228 Wardle, supra note 3, at 194 ("Of the few statutory exceptions in con-
science clauses, the most common are for medical emergencies."). However, few
states provide such exceptions. Id.
229 See ARK. CODE ANN § 20-16-304 (2000); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 36-11-70
(Michie 2003); and S.B. 2619, 2004 Leg. Reg. Sess. (Miss. 2004) (enacted).
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230gencies are often restricted to life-threatening conditions. Moreover,
it is doubtful that legislatures would create broad medical broad emer-
gency exceptions to pharmacist conscience clauses, since those excep-
tions would defeat pharmacists' ability to refuse to dispense contra-
ception in most cases.231 Therefore, the medical emergency solution is
not viable.
A final solution is to label multipurpose drugs as either abortifa-
cients or contraceptives so that a pharmacist may act accordingly.
232
This could compromise patient privacy.2 33 For instance, providing a
pharmacist with information regarding the purpose of a drug would
likely threaten patient confidentiality when drugs like RU-486, which
are likely to inspire boycotts or protestors, are involved. 34 Further-
more, as one commentator noted, since prescriptions do not always
entail knowledge of a patient's history, a pharmacist's "judgments
regarding the acceptability of a prescription may be medically inap-
propriate. 235 Presumably, because the medical definition of preg-
nancy treats both birth control and EC as contraceptives, these drugs
would always be labeled as contraceptives, regardless of whether they
were used before or after fertilization. In other words, this solution
would be unhelpful to objecting pharmacists.
230 See IOWA CODE ANN. § 146.1 (West 2004) ("Abortion does not include
medical care which has as its primary purpose the treatment of a serious physical
condition requiring emergency medical treatment necessary to save the life of a
mother.") (emphasis added); and MD. CODE. ANN., HEALTH-GEN. I § 20-214(d)(1)
(2004).
[A] health care provider.., is not immune from civil damages, if available
at law, or from disciplinary or other recriminatory action, if the failure to re-
fer a patient to a source for any medical procedure that results in steriliza-
tion or termination of pregnancy would reasonably be determined as: ...
The cause of death or serious physical injury....
Id. (emphasis added); OKLA STAT. tit. 63, § 1-741(B) (2004).
No person may be required to perform, induce or participate in medical
procedures which result in an abortion which are in preparation for an abor-
tion or which involve aftercare of an abortion patient, except when the af-
tercare involves emergency medical procedures which are necessary to pro-
tect the life of the patient.
Id. (emphasis added).
131 For instance, if rape, contraceptive failure, and consensual sexual inter-
course were considered medical emergencies, pharmacist conscience clauses contain-
ing a medical emergency exemption would never allow pharmacists to refuse to dis-
pense birth control or EC, since these forms of contraception would inevitably impli-
cate one of these "medical emergencies."
232 Cf. Allen & Brushwood, supra note 46, at 14-15 (describing this proposal
in the context of assisted suicide).
233 Cf id. at 15 (discussing this issue in the context of assisted suicide).
234 Id.
235 Cantor & Baum, supra note 5, at 2010.
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The most viable solution is to redraft current conscience clauses
so as to require pharmacists who object to dispensing contraceptives
to refer patients to a willing pharmacist. Conscience clauses should
also provide that if referral is impossible or impractical, the objecting
236pharmacist must dispense contraception. In rural areas, referrals
should be reasonably nearby.237 Mandatory distribution should be
required where women, either because of time, location, or financial
status, are unable to obtain effective contraception. Although this pro-
posal will thwart pharmacists' consciences in some situations, this
solution guarantees that women will be able to access contraceptives,
regardless of whether their pharmacist sympathizes with their plight.
Additionally, this proposal may protect pharmacists' consciences in
those situations where pharmacists do not find referral objectionable.
This is the same approach adopted by Rod R. Blagojevich, the Gover-
nor of Illinois, in an April 1, 2005 emergency rule.238
IV. POLICY CONSIDERATIONS
As this Note previously stated, the unconstitutionality of con-
science clauses does not mandate that pharmacists in private practice
provide contraceptives. Obviously, pharmacists who refuse to dis-
pense contraceptives in the absence of a conscience clause face legal
liability and possible demotion or termination as a result of their deci-
sion. For some pharmacists, legal and employment ramifications alone
may not be enough to sway their conduct. However, policy considera-
tions dictate that pharmacists should dispense contraception even
when doing so violates their conscience.239
Though it seems unlikely that women will resort to illicit, unsafe
methods of contraception in the absence of legally available alterna-
236 See id, at 2011.
237 Id.
23s Illinois Emergency Rule Requires Pharmacies to Fill Prescriptions for
Contraceptives, [2005] Pharmaceutical Law & Industry Report (BNA), at 355 (Apr.
8, 2005). California, Missouri, New Jersey, West Virginia, and Congress are also
considering similar legislation that would ensure a patient's access to prescriptions.
McDonough, supra note 18. Under a recent policy, the AMA will support state legis-
lation requiring pharmacists to fill prescriptions or refer patients to willing pharma-
cists. Bruce Jaspen, Rx-filling Mandate Backed by AMA; Contraceptive Denial
Prompts Resolution, CHI. TRIB., June 21, 2005, at C-1.
239 Contra Cantor & Baum, supra note 5, at 2008-09; Brian Kaatz, Position 2:
Pharmacist Has the Right to Refuse, in Pharmacist's Refusal to Dispense Diethylstil-
bestrol for Contraceptive Use, 46 AM. J. HOSP. PHARMACY 1414, 1414-15 (1989)
(arguing that pharmacists should not be required to dispense contraceptives);
Weinstein, supra note 168, at 222.
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tives, 240 the unavailability of contraception will almost undoubtedly
increase the number of medical and surgical abortions, which is pre-
sumably an undesirable prospect for pharmacists who place a high
value on fetal life.24' Studies show that large numbers of American
women rely on contraceptives to prevent unwanted pregnancy. Over-
all, 60 percent of American women between fifteen and forty-four use
some form of contraception. 242 Between 80 percent243 and 90 per-
cene" of American women use birth control at some point in their
lives. In 2003, an estimated sixteen million women used birth-control
pills, spending over $2.8 billion.245 EC sales range between $12 and
$15 million per year.246 Roughly twelve million American women use
EC each year, making it the most used type of birth control after ster-
ilization.247 Eighty-three percent of obstetrician-gynecologists and 37
percent of family practice physicians prescribed EC at least once in
2000.248 Furthermore, increasing numbers of women are using EC.
249
One percent of American women used EC in 1997, whereas 2 percent
of American women used EC in 2000, which constitutes an absolute
increase of 1 percent within a three-year period.250
Given the staggering numbers of women who rely on contracep-
tion, if pharmacists' refusal to dispense contraceptives significantly
affects women's access to contraception, the number of abortions will
almost undoubtedly rise.251 Over the years, a general decrease in the
240 Cf. Dresser, supra note 26, at 281 ("[W]omen who cannot assume [the
burdens of obtaining abortions] will increasingly seek abortions from unqualified
persons, thus exposing themselves to serious health risks."); Mickey Smith, The Abor-
tion Pill, in PHARMACY ETHics 298, 298 (Mickey Smith et al. eds., 1991) (describing
the laity's (unsuccessful) search for effective abortion pills, which have included
cotton root bark extract and "synthetic vasopressin nasal spray (administered vagi-
nally)").
241 For pharmacists who value fetal life equally at all stages of development
after conception, this argument will be unconvincing.
242 SUSAN DELLER Ross ET AL., THE RIGHTS OF WOMEN: THE BASIC ACLU
GUIDE TO WOMEN'S RIGHTS 194 (Sally Master ed., 3d ed. 1993).
243 See id. at 196.
244 Gardner, supra note 7, at 11.
245 Jacobson & Kovach, supra note 44, at 1A. For a description of the world-
wide use of birth control, see Ross ET AL., supra note 242, at 196 (stating that sixty
million women worldwide used the pill in 1990).
246 Simon, supra note 3.
247 Bollinger, supra note 75, at 152. Cf Ross ET AL., supra note 242, at 194
("Among never-married black women, sterilization increased most significantly be-
tween 1982 and 1988 and is now second only to oral contraceptives.").
248 Bennett et al., supra note 59, at 266.
249 Id.
250 Id.
251 See Bollinger, supra note 75, at 156.
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number of abortions is in part due to "changes in contraceptive prac-
tices. 252 Other countries have successfully employed birth control to
decrease the rate of pregnancy and abortion.253 Of the 50 percent of
pregnancies in the U.S. that are unplanned, 50 percent of those end in
abortion.254 Consequently, nearly 1.5 million pregnancies end in abor-
tion each year.255 Restricting access to birth control will certainly in-
crease the number of unintended pregnancies and abortions. However,
because almost half of unintended pregnancies result from contracep-
tive failures, restricting access to EC will also contribute to the num-
ber of abortions performed every year.256 In 2000, EC prevented
roughly 51,000 pregnancies and is responsible for a 43 percent drop in
the abortion rate in the last decade.25 According to one estimate, EC
could prevent 17,000 pregnancies each year in Alabama alone.258 Of
those pregnancies, 4,000 would probably be terminated by abortion.
259
Pharmacists, who play an important role in distributing and stocking
EC, can curb the abortion rate by dispensing it.260 In sum, if pharma-
cists are interested in preventing abortions, they should ensure that
their patients have access to the contraceptives they request.
252 Julia Lichtman, Restrictive State Abortion Laws: Today's Most Powerful
Conscience Clause, 10 GEO. J. ON POvERTY L. & POL'Y 345, 356 (2003).
253 See LAURENCE H. TRIBE, ABORTION: THE CLASH OF ABSOLUTES 212
(1990).
In Sweden a law was enacted in 1974 that was designed to increase the use
of birth control in order to reduce the rate of abortion. This law put into
place an aggressive program of birth control education and provided for re-
ductions in the cost of contraceptives. The result has been a sharp decrease
in the rate of both teenage pregnancy and abortion in Sweden.
Id.
254 Marji Gold et al., Medical Options for Early Pregnancy Termination, 56
AM. FAM. PHYSICIAN 533, 533 (1997).
255 See Giannetti, supra note 20, at 699. See also Gold et al., supra note 254,
at 533. Cf. Golden et al., supra note 17, at 287 (stating that "[a]lthough the rate of
adolescent pregnancy in the United States is declining, it is still more than twice that
of other industrialized countries").
256 See Wyser-Pratte, supra note 16, at 1122.
257 Bennett et al., supra note 59, at 261.
258 All, supra note 76.
259 id.
260 Bennett et al., supra note 59, at 261 (stating that pharmacists can also
increase access to EC by advising medical colleagues, answering women's questions,
and dispelling misconceptions about EC, such as the belief that EC is identical to
mifepristone).
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CONCLUSION
Pharmacists, intent not to be considered pharmaceutical "vending
machines,"2 61 now enter into a "complex social situation"262 each time
they dispense a drug that could be considered immoral. Though
pharmacists' refusal is not yet an epidemic,263 this "dangerous
261 See Testimony, supra note 42 ("I was told that a 'pharmacist' conscience
clause was bizarre because a pharmacist is simply a conduit of the physician's
wishes."); Allen & Brushwood, supra note 46, at 1 ("Once thought of as mere retail
dealers in a product, pharmacists have expanded their activities as service providers to
patients, and have adopted a mission for themselves referred to as 'pharmaceutical
care."') ("[I]n filling a prescription, especially given the recent advances in pharmacy
practice, a pharmacist is no longer a mere bystander in drug therapy."). Cf Daar,
supra note 221, at 1245.
[Sitripped of their ability to advocate based on their own belief system, doc-
tors may begin to perceive themselves as 'medical vending machines'
whose only role is to dispense medical treatments. This image of a physi-
cian as a mere purveyor of medical 'goods' belies the notion that an essen-
tial element of the doctor-patient relationship is open communication about
treatment options.
Id.
While some conscience clause advocates are fond of comparing the situa-
tion of pharmacists to that of conscientious objectors to the draft, this is a poor anal-
ogy because pharmacists voluntarily enter their profession, unlike those who are
involuntarily drafted. See Cantor & Baum, supra note 5, at 2009; Dickens, supra note
4, at 292-93. Rather, the women who are forced to endure pregnancy against their
wishes are more like conscripts than objecting pharmacists, since those women's
bodies are effectively conscripted by pharmacists who refuse to dispense contracep-
tion. See id. at 293 (quoting Justice Blackmun, who stated, "By restricting the right to
terminate pregnancies, the State conscripts women's bodies into its service .... The
State does not compensate women for their services." Planned Parenthood of South-
eastern Pennsylvania v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 928 (1992) (Blackmun, J., dissenting).).
Cf Charo, supra note 207, at 2473 ("Claiming an unfettered right to personal auton-
omy while holding monopolistic control over a public good constitutes an abuse of
the public trust.").
262 Smith, supra note 240, at 300. See Giannetti, supra note 20, at 700 (pre-
dicting that "[i]f abortifacients become increasingly accepted or preferred as a method
of inducing abortions, many pharmacists in the United States will find themselves
facing, in their practice, the same ethical issues that society is grappling with"). For a
discussion of pharmacists' increased role in health care, see Allen & Brushwood,
supra note 46, at 2-6; and Herbe, supra note 33, at 77-78, 83 ("The proliferation of
abortive and contraceptive drug therapies has thrust many pharmacists into roles as
facilitators of practices they oppose on fundamental levels.") ("Whether they like it or
not, pharmacists are being thrust into the role of common, everyday providers of
controversial reproductive medications.").
263 See Gardner, supra note 7, at 11 (quoting Lisa Boyce, vice president of
public affairs for Planned Parenthood of Wisconsin) (according to Michael Stewart,
spokesman for the American Pharmacists Association, "In the great majority of cases,
the pharmacist's right to conscience is exercised appropriately and seamlessly, so the
patient is not even aware that the pharmacist has exercised that right."); Jacobson &
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trend' '264 threatens to erode women's access to contraception.
Consequently, conscience clauses that encourage pharmacists to
refuse to dispense contraception also threaten women's constitutional
right to access contraception. Because these conscience clauses do not
serve a compelling state interest and are not narrowly tailored to
advance any state interest, they violate the constitutional right of
privacy described in Griswold and Carey. While the fact that
pharmacist conscience clauses are unconstitutional does not require
pharmacists to dispense contraception, pharmacists' refusal will likely
increase the number of abortions. Presumably, this is an unattractive
prospect for those pharmacists who find birth control and EC
objectionable. Although part of this debate could soon be moot, as the
federal government and several states are considering legislation that
would enable EC to be sold over the counter, 265 standard birth control
pills still remain a controversial drug for many pharmacists.
Kovach, supra note 44, at lA (citing the Executive Director of the Texas State Board
of Pharmacy, who stated that she was unaware of any pharmacist ever refusing to fill
a prescri tion on moral or religious grounds).
Kovach, supra note 10, at IA (quoting officials at Planned Parenthood
Federation of America).
265 Simon, supra note 3. The FDA's rejection of OTC sale of EC was based
largely on the belief that it would result in increased unsafe sexual activity and the
spread of STDs. Raine, et al. supra note 69, at 62. Such beliefs are not restricted to
the United States. See Hariparsad, supra note 17, at 89.
[M]ore than half of the pharmacists [in Durban, South Africa] indicated that
the increased availability of emergency contraceptive pills would increase
promiscuity, 60 [percent] felt that increased availability of emergency con-
traceptive pills would decrease the use of the barrier methods of contracep-
tion, and 58 [percent] indicated that increased emergency contraception
availability would be likely to increase the incidence of sexually transmitted
diseases (STDs).
Id. However, a recent study claims that such concerns are unfounded. See Raine, et al.
supra note 69, at 62. Unlike in the United States, EC is currently available OTC in
some countries, such as the United Kingdom. Iris F. Litt, Placing Emergency Contra-
ception in the Hands of Women, 293 JAMA 98, 98 (2005).
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